FBIS DAILY REPORT

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SOVIET INTRACTABILITY AT INF TALKS DENIED

LD111447 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 10 Sep 83

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Aleksey Sokolov -- interview with Moscow Radio Geneva correspondent Vsevolod Shishovskiy]

[Excerpt] This is what the Greek RIZOSPASTIS wrote in connection with the conclusion of the Madrid meeting: Its results confirm once again that the possibilities of the policy of detente are far from being exhausted. The specific steps agreed upon in Madrid could promote its dynamic continuation and development. Will such a continuation be forthcoming in Geneva? Here is Vsevolod Shishkovskiy:

[Shishkovskiy] In their comments on the start of what is, according to all indications, the final round of the Soviet-American talks in Geneva, observers are pointing out that it will be crucial. After all, much depends on its outcome. Either a mutually acceptable agreement will be reached, making it possible to avert an exacerbation of the nuclear confrontation, or the new American missiles will appear in Europe, which will unquestionably entail inevitable countermeasures from the Soviet Union and its allies, as has been explicitly indicated to Washington.

As is well known, our country has for the whole of the last few months made repeated efforts to ensure that things do not go that far. Convincing proof of our goodwill is also provided by the Soviet Union's readiness -- in the event of a mutually acceptable agreement including a decision by the United States not to deploy its new missiles in Europe -- to eliminate in the European part of the USSR those of our medium-range missiles that would be subject to reductions, a readiness voiced by Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov in his replies to PRAVDA.

[Sokolov] Much of the foriegn news media and many prominent politicians have rated this Soviet initiative positively. What, in your view, is the attitude of the U.S. Government?

[Shishkovskiy] One gets the impression that, by all accounts, Washington does not plan to respond constructively to the new Soviet peace proposals and that it has already gradually started talking about the intractability of the Russians, who, according to Washington, do not wish to seek agreement. The whole world can see, however, whose fault it is that the Geneva dialogue has been deadlocked for so many months.

WEEKLY 'INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ROUNDTABLE'

LD111619 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 11 Sep 83

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Rudolf Georgiyevich Kolchanov, deputy editor-in-chief of TRUD; Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Lebedev, head of a department of the journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN; and Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zholkver, political observer of Central Television and All-Union Radio]

[Text] [Zholkver] Hello, comrades. the past week has, so to speak, reflected the whole diversity and complexity of the present-day international situation particularly vividly. On the one hand, this week the meeting of representatives of the states participating in the CSCE Conference ended successfully in Madrid. In Geneva the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear armaments on the European Continent resumed. At the same time, however, the Washington Administration, making use of the incident involving the South Korean aircraft, has chosen this particlar time to unleash a frenzied anti-Soviet campaign and is trying to whip up the arms race even more and destroy normal interstate relations. To this one should add the further escalation of American military activity in a whole number of regions of the globe: the Near East, Central America, Africa, and the Far East. However, one also cannot fail to note the new upsurge in the antiwar movement in many countries, particularly the states of Western Europe, where demonstrations against the plans for the deployment here of new American nuclear missiles are spreading. It seems to me that the whole of this diversity of manifestations in the present international situation was displayed particularly vividly, if you please, in Madrid, where the ministers of foreign affairs of 33 European states and the United States and Canada have been meeting over the past few days.

CSCE Meeting in Madrid

[Kolchanov] It is difficult not to agree with this, Aleksandr Vladimirovich. The whole diversity of the contradictions in present-day international relations has indeed been very clearly reflected in Madrid. The talks -- the meeting itself -- lasted, as is known, for almost 3 years, and finally a positive final document was signed. These 3 years were a period of fine political and diplomatic maneuvers, with the defense of principles... [Zholkver interrupts]

[Zholkver] I would not say that they were always fine.

[Kolchanov] That depends on whose maneuvers.

[Zholkver] Yes.

[Kolchanov] ... with the defense of principles, of principled positions, and reasonable compromise as well, for those who wanted to show good political sense. At the same time, these years have shown the position, the very precise and accurate position, of all taking part in this Madrid meeting. So let's take the Americans: Washington, as is known, took things into a blind alley and tried to block the talks, accompanying its actions with anti-Soviet propaganda.

The countries of the West, by virtue of their class solidarity and alliance obligations under NATO, frequently spoke with the United States, but they did not keep completely within the reins of the White House cowboys. They displayed a realistic understanding of the international situation and embarked upon the path of continuing the policy of detente.

The neutral and nonaligned countries made a considerable contribution to the achievement of a positive result. But the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community played the main role in the success of Madrid.

[Zholkver] Yes. I might recall Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov's words to the effect that, despite the line of well-known forces, in a bitter and prolonged political struggle at the international conference an overwhelming majority of states exercised their choice in favor of finding mutually acceptable solutions, and this is a healthy sign and one that gives grounds for hope.

[Kolchanov] So what are the results of the Madrid meeting? Many conclusions can be drawn from its work, but no doubt the most important of them amounts to the fact that, under conditions in which the international situation is being sharply aggravated, the meeting in the Spanish capital has once again convincingly shown that the only means for a possible solution to the most intricate disputes are provided not by confrontation and a policy from a position of strength, but by talks. I would say that both political realism and political good sense, which take mankind's desire to live under conditions of peace into account, consist precisely in this, in not cutting the Gordian knot of international problems, but in untying it. Without any doubt, the fact that the final document is linked directly with the final document that was signed in Helsinki is an important positive element.

Those taking part in the Madrid talks confirmed the need to strictly and rigorously respect and implement in practice all ten principles that must lie at the basis of relations between states participating in the all-European conference. They include the principle of respect for the sovereignty of states, noninterference in their internal affairs, and the inviolability of their frontiers. At the Madrid meeting an accord was reached on the holding of a conference on measures to strengthen confidence and security and on disarmament in Europe in January 1984 in Stockholm. Practical preparations for this conference are to begin soon. The majority of the participants' desire to move along the path of detente is also shown by the decision to hold a third meeting, following those of Belgrade and Madrid, in 1986 in the Austrian capital. In short, detente is alive, and has to remain so. This was shown by the Madrid meeting.

[Zholkver] Well, it seems to me that the Madrid meeting showed -- and this, too, is very important -- that ideological differences should not be transferred to relations between states.

[Kolchanov] Between states.

[Zholkver] This concerns very many problems, including, say, the human rights issue. This is a very acute and important question. For example, we consider that it is indeed perfectly inadmissible to ignore such a very important human right as the right to work. This issue was raised in a very acute way in a number of Western countries during the very days that the Madrid meeting was taking place. If my memory does not deceive me, it coincided with the holding of Labor Day in the United States -- Labor Day, when those deprived of this right took to the streets.

U.S. Labor Day 'Mockery'

[Lebedev] Indeed, on Labor Day working America replied to the President and reminded him that the ardour with which he defends the rights of the working people is worth little in practice.

Moreover, I will permit myself to quote the words of one of the trade union figures of the banned trade union of air traffic controllers, a trade union that has been dissolved in the United States -- well, on Labor Day, one of the leaders of this destroyed trade union said: The fact that I am behind bars on Labor Day is a cruel mockery. As in many other manifestations of the American Administration's policy in the social field, this is a cruel mockery of the American working people.

[Zholkver] Not just the American working people: Look at the situation in other countries of the West. A new draft budget is now being discussed in the FRG, and in presenting this budget the Federal Government stated that it proceeds from the fact that the number of people out of work will on average amount to 2.5 million people -- and this is for next year. In Britain the number of people out of work exceeds 3 million, and you, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, quite rightly say that this is accompanied by an offensive against trade union organizations: At the congress of British trade unions they have been talking with indignation about the antiworker legislation that has been worked out by the Thatcher government. As one of the trade union leaders put it, it is a question of an attempt to castrate the British trade unions, to suppress any possibility of the British working people struggling for their rights, including the right to work. That is how the issue of human rights stands.

[Kolchanov] I would like to stress your line of thought, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, as regards the attempts by the Reagan administration and the administrations of other capitalist countries to deal arbitrarily with trade union movements. I was in the United States 3 months ago. I had very many conversations with trade union leaders at low, middle, and the very highest levels, and this concern showed through everywhere. They deal harshly with trade union rights, particularly under present crisis conditions, when it is already very difficult to implement these limited, cut-down trade union rights in America.

'Provocation' of KAL Incident

[Zholkver] But, of course, one of the most important, if not the most important, human rights is the right to life. This right is being completely ignored by the American Administration. These are the victims: the victims of the provocation, which was planned in advance, involving the violation of Soviet airspace by a South Korean aircraft. These victims are on Washington's account, on account of those who sent this aircraft.

We were at the press conference that was held by Marshal Ogarkov, chief of the Soviet General Staff. Comrade Korniyenko, a representative of the foreign ministry, also took part, and the press conference was conducted by Leonid Mitrofanovich Zamyatin, head of the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee. At this press conference it was vividly shown -- you remember: A large map was shown -- just how this provocation was prepared and carried out, as a result of which people who were, indeed, guilty of nothing, but who had become hostages for the organizers of this provocation, died.

[Kolchanov] This press conference rightly stressed and convincingly showed how patiently and how truly humanely we did things with the object of getting the aircraft to land during the period of at least 2 hours when the violating aircraft was within the Soviet Union's airspace, in order to check the true aims and the essence of the circumstances -- to sort them out -- and prevent any human casualties.

[Zholkver] It must be remembered that this was not the first provocation of this kind. We may recall a similar incident involving another aircraft -- a South Korean one, too, which violated the Soviet frontier in the neighborhood of Murmansk in 1978. If one goes back even further into history, there was American air spy Powers' flight of sad renown in 1960.

This year there have already been 12 violations of the Soviet air frontiers by American aircraft in the Far East, including violations by aircraft which have been taking off from American aircraft carriers. Moreover, the CIA does not hesitate to organize air crashes, as happened, for example, in October 1976, when -- as you remember -- an American explosive device was planted on a Cuban passenger aircraft.

[Kolchanov] Indeed, human life is worth precisely nothing to those who are now talking about how they now value it very highly. This event has stressed yet again both the hypocrisy and the sanctimoniousness -- and, of course, the barbarity and the perfidy -- of the American special services and Administration.

[Zholkver] This is characteristic, for the Americans have not just killed Vietnamese and waged that filthy war. What is happening now? Americans are waging war in Lebanon and American ships and American helicopters are firing on Beirut and other population centers, and people are dying.

[Kolchanov] Of course, this is... [Zholkver interrupts]

[Zholkver] Americans are waging war -- moreover, together with the French -- in Chad, and people are dying. Americans are waging war in Latin America, and people are dying: Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, has been bombed, and I would like to recall that it was to America's shame that CIA agents organized the crash of the Nicaraguan helicopter in which 75 children died. They did not shed any crocodile tears on that occasion. But the world will not forget this: It will never forget it, just as it will never forget the fact that it was indeed with the complicity of the United States that the bloody putsch was carried out in Chile 10 years ago, and people who oppose Pinochet's military junta, which is still supported by the United States, are dying now.

[Kolchanov] They are murders that go on over a long time, if you like: they are not over. It's something that goes on over many years.

[Zholkver] Indeed, I think that all this was not so much an act of air sabotage as one of political sabotage.

[Lebedev] Yes, without doubt, this is first and foremost political sabotage. Here a long-term political aim was taken, and it was not a chance aim, so to speak. The timing of the incident was not chosen by chance. We have just now been speaking about the results of the Madrid meeting, but many other talks have also started: In particular, talks have begun -- and one might say that this is the decisive round -- in the talks in Geneva on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe. These Geneva talks have already been going on for more than a year, and there are no results: Clearly, the Americans do not want a result. Of course, a story like the one about this aircraft is used to its full capacity, so to speak, in order to draw attention away from the essence of the talks and speed up the deployment of the new missiles. Moreover, it now follows quite openly from a very large number of reports in the Western press, including the American press, that the President believes that all this at least makes it easier to implement the plan for the deployment of missiles in Western Europe; that with this it will also be possible to ease the passage of allocations for many other militarist programs through Congress; and, of course, that this will make it possible to knock down the wave of the antiwar movement.

Incidentally, that does not only apply to America. According to NEUE PRESSE, Moellemann, minister of state at the FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recently stated that the incident should serve as a reason for supporters of the antiwar movement to cease their current blockade in the West German town of Mutlangen of the access route to an American base situated in the area. In other words, they clearly want to take the heat out of this antinuclear and antimissile movement.

[Kolchanov] Their line of thought really is quite clear: First create a provocation. Create a low, barbaric incident, and then use it for one's own political purposes, saying: Just look how vicious the Russians are: How can you conduct talks with them?"

[Zholkver] This was revealed in Reagan's speech on 5 October [date as heard]. His credo is "peace through strength." What is involved is the buildup of armaments and an attempt to dictate conditions to the Soviet Union. In a word, what is involved is an attempt to gain military superiority. Comrade Ustinov, the Soviet Union's minister of defense, drew attention to this when he spoke in Sevastopol, noting that the imperialist powers, led by the United States, are effectively sabotaging all talks with the Soviet Union that might be founded on the principle of equality and equal security of the sides. They are fundamentally striving to wreck the existing balance of strategic forces, to force the USSR into unilateral disarmament and surpass us in armaments and armed forces. As Comrade Ustinov stressed, however, these attempts are futile: The Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community will never permit military superiority over them.

Geneva Disarmament Talks

[Lebedev] In this connection, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, perhaps we could return for just a second to the Geneva talks on European nuclear weapons and recall how, so to speak, it all began and how things developed. Well, one knows how it began: It began when in 1979 NATO made the decision to carry out a so-called upgrading of armaments. What in fact they had in mind was the deployment of 572 new American missiles in a group of West European NATO countries. This was allegedly done in response to the Soviet Union's deployment of its SS-20 missiles. All the subsequent events and talks, the way they developed, and the debates, showed that the SS-20's had nothing to do with the NATO decision as such.

That is admitted -- interestingly enough by Treverton, a former official of the U.S. National Security Council. He had said that the real point was not the SS-20's. The real purpose of the NATO decision -- and I quote -- was to place a considerably larger number of nuclear weapons with a longer range in the hands of the North Atlantic Bloc. By the way, he also noted -- he added that, as far as talks were concerned, the American Administration regarded them merely as a concession, as he put it, to Europe's naive commitment to arms control and a cover for the deployment of new missiles.

[Kolchanov] Incidentallly, the actual upgrading of armaments, which the NATO authorities formally decided on at the end of 1979 -- the actual decision on upgrading armaments was made in the early '70's, when the Pershing II's were ordered.

[Unidentified speaker, in background] And the Tomahawks [Kolchanov interrupts]

[Kolchanov] It was effectively already decided in advance, and linking this with the SS-20 would be....[Lebedev interrupts]

[Lebedev] The reason they were being prepared is clear. By way of an illustration, let us just return very briefly to the stages the talks passed through. From the very start we made a proposal, we put forward a radical measure: To rid Europe completely of all nuclear weapons... [Kolchanov interrupts]

[Kolchanov] It would really have been a zero option!

[Lebedev, continuing]...both tactical and medium-range nuclear weapons. Yes, that would be a Zero Option, and it would mean a zone free of nuclear weapons in Europe. But Washington simply did not even want to listen to this proposal or discuss it.

We then put forward our net proposal, of a more partial nature, but still quite radical: That there should be a threefold reduction of all the medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, with no new ones deployed at the same time, of course. Both sides, that is, our side and the Western Side, the NATO side --- that is, of course, Britain, France, and the United States — would then have roughly 300 units left each, 300 carriers. But this proposal was also not accepted. Why? So that we would get, so to speak, superiority... [Kolchanov interrupts]

[Kolchanov] In warheads.

[Lebedev] Yes -- warheads. Here, no doubt it must be quite specifically stated that when one talks about medium-range nuclear weapons one has in mind not only missiles, but planes carrying warheads, too, and the Americans have something more than 700 planes in Western Europe -- this is an immense armada -- and approximately 7,000 nuclear warheads in total. It must also be considered that Britain and France have about 400 warheads, so that, in general, one must take an overall and balanced account of all these weapons, keeping this principle, which is surely the only condition for the achievement of the accord that we are proposing, in mind: The principle of equality and equal security. In connection with this, too, they have stated that we, so to speak, are left with too many missiles in the event of such a reduction to 1/3. Then we made the next step: We agreed to leave ourselves with a number of missiles equal to that held by the Western side, that is, by Britain and France.

[Kolchanov] Missiles and planes.

[Lebedev] They have something in the order of 162, and that is the number we were prepared to leave on our side, but naturally at the same time equalizing the number of planes in each corresponding class. Again, this proposal was not accepted on the pretext -- which you have just mentioned — that allegedly our missiles are equipped with a greater number of warheads, and an inequality in warheads arises.

Again, we made another very concrete proposal: That we agree not only about the carriers, but about an equality in warheads, in nuclear warheads. Well, what more is needed, one might ask? The more so since with the sort of reduction that we proposed we would have significantly fewer of both carriers and warheads in the European zone than we had, let us say, up to 1976. Essentially, the NATO decision was allegedly based on the fact that... [Kolchanov interrupts]

[Kolchanov] Of course.

[Lebedev] This proposal again remains -- or rather the United States and its allies state that it is — not enough. But what are they proposing instead? Well, you have already reminded us that they are proposing the zero option, as well as the so-called intermediate option, as it were, as a demonstration of their flexibility.

[Zholkver] But the zero option is altogether impossible, that is ... [Kolchanov interrupts]

[Kolchanov] Nothing for you, everything for me.

[Zholkver] No missiles for the Soviet Union, and no reduction for NATO.

[Lebedev] That is to say they are, properly speaking, selling the zero option -- properly sepaking -- in exchange for nothing at all. In this connection they are simply saying that they will give up what they have not got -- that is, the as-yet undeployed missiles.

[Zholkver] And the Soviet Union must give up ... [Lebedev interrupts]

[Lebedev] It must give up what it has. It must... [Zholkver interrupts]

[Zholkver] Eliminate its missiles.

[Lebedev] Moreover, eliminate all its missiles. And not only in Europe, but in Asia, too, although Asia is no subject for the talks in Geneva about European nuclear... [Kolchavov interrupts]

[Kolchanov] Yes, it was a question of medium-range missiles for Europe. In Europe -- and Asia, of course, has nothing to do with this.

[Zholkver] And then there were the excuses they made: Where will the Soviet Union put those missiles that it is ready to reduce in Europe? Where will it send them? Will it just be beyond the Urals? Well, they would be a threat to Japan there.

[Lebedev] This was followed by our latest proposal, which was made by Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov in his replies to PRAVDA:

In order to cut the ground out from under these speculations regarding what will be done with the reduced missiles, it was completely clearly stated that we are ready to dismantle and destroy all the reduced missiles. Consequently, there could be no talk of redeployment in the East. Nor could there be talk -- as there was in the West -- of it being easy to redeploy them. There can be no question of that. What we are talking about is the destruction of those missiles that would be over the number of corresponding missiles held by the Western side.

[Kolchanov] Naturally, there is a condition for this... [Zholkver interrupts]

[Zholkver] Naturally: It is on the condition that the American missiles are not deployed. In this connection it is interesting that LE MATIN, the French newspaper which has sympathies that are far from lying with our country, said that the latest proposal by the Soviet Union had put the American side in a difficult position. In Geneva Moscow intends to discuss the question of reducing not only the number of medium-range missiles, but also the number of bombers carrying medium-range nuclear weapons. In this way the Geneva talks will touch upon all nuclear weapons in Europe: missiles, bombers, and even nuclear warheads. A difficult position for the American delegation.

[Lebedev] Yes, and there it must be further clarified that the missiles being reduced and dismantled will include a significant number of the most modern SS-20's, too.

[Zholkver] Well, I think that this fuss is largely aimed at creating ever-new excuses in order to bring about the deployment regardless.

[Lebedev] Deployment, Yes. In addition to this, you know that now, when you listen to speeches by officials -- both American and West European -- If their, quote, arguments, unquote, against our proposals have been removed, they now emphasize the fact that although, they say, the latest Soviet proposal is, as it were, a step in the right direction, it is not enough, because the Soviet Union is still insisting on taking the British and French weapons into account, and this is unacceptable to the West. Well, I ask: Why is it unacceptable?

[Zholkver] In the first place, how can one not insist when even...[Lebedev interrupts]

[Lebadev] They do, after all, exist, they are real.

[Zholkver] The U.S. Congressional Research Service admitted...[Kolchanov interrupts]

[Kolchanov] And they are not aimed at the West...[Lebadev interrupts]

[Lebedev] They are aimed at us. You mentioned the U.S. Congressional Research Service, which admitted, in general, that the argument of not taking them into account is groundless. Incidentally, one might add that the West German Social Democrats recently -- the chairman of the SPD faction in the Bundestag, Vogel -- said that of course they must be taken into account. [sentence as heard]

It is impossible not to take them into account. I can simply quote data from the Stockholm International Institute for Studying Problems of the world. They are not toy weapons. They are modern weapons. In addition to this, programs are known to exist -- which are being carried out at top speed in both Britain and France -- for the modernization and increase of these weapons. If one considers that there are now approximately 400 warheads there, then according to data from the Stockholm Institute there will be more than 1500 of them by the end of the century; in addition to this, they are being qualitatively modernized. How can one not take them into account? Well, they say that Britain and France are allegedly independent countries, and that their weapons are independent. Here again there is word juggling, since from whom they are independent is clear. Both say that they will side with NATO in the event of a conflict, so to speak. That is clear to all.

[Kolchanov] Yes. And take a NATO country like Holland. The Dutch Parliament had made a decision that, of course, they must be taken into account.

[Lebedev] Yes. The main thing here is that no one is trying, we are not trying, to encroach on sovereignty. No one is saying that they must eliminate, so to speak, or reduce these means of theirs. But it is necessary, of course, to take them into account in the general balance, both European and global.

[Kolchanov] Yes. It is simply impossible not to take into account these forces when conducting any talks on nuclear weapons.

[Indistinct interjection]

[Lebedev] Excuse me, when the SALT talks were under way, they were saying that these were medium-range weapons and that they were not [as heard] allegedly meant for the European theater. Now that the European theater is being discussed, they have become strategic. As far as we are concerned: What is the difference?

[Zholkver] Excuses. Why, just look. On Wednesday last week, the latest test launch of an American Pershing II was carried out. And, as a representative of the Army said, this was the penultimate test launch, although of the last 17 launches, half were failures. The missiles blew up... [Lebedev interrupts]

[Lebedev] Yes. In the air and some took a different trajectory.

[Lebedev] The Europeans, moreover, are rightly somewhat afraid... [Zholkver interrupts]

[Zholkver] But just look, this representative of the Army directly and immediately added that the penultimate test launch will take place and these missiles must be deployed in the FRG by December of this year. [sentence as heard] I cite a report by the UP agency from Cape Canaveral, from where the test launch was carried. Put briefly, the missiles will be deployed and that is that!

[Lebedev] Yes, and they are very little concerned that according to the latest polls, as you know, 75 percent of the West Germans are against... [Kolchanov interrupts]

[Kolchanov] Against the deployment of the new nuclear... [Zholkver interrupts]

[Zholkver] And we are talking about the installation of missiles in one's own country that blow up even in peacetime!

[Kolchanov] In peacetime! And what would happen in the event of a conflict?

[Zholkver] The whole point, however, is that in order to create such a psychological atmosphere for the deployment of these missiles and for increasing the arms race, the Americans and Washington needed actions such as sending the aircraft into our airspace -- this enormous and brazen provocation, designed to be used to boost tension and to create an atmosphere in which preparations for nuclear war can be mounted. Admittedly, I must say that despite this frantic campaign, more soberminded politicians, including some in the United States itself, are warning against this dangerous game, playing with fire -- particularly peace campaigners and those involved in the anti-war movement.... [unidentified voice interrupts]

[Unidentified voice] And the anti-missile movement.

[Zholkver] They are advocating the continuation of dialogue. They are urging that this incident should not be allowed to be deliberately used both to wreck the talks on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe and to justify this unprecedented build-up of weapons of mass destruction. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, as Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko stressed in Madrid -- in Madrid and at other international forums and talks -- in all areas of world politics, the Soviet Union vigorously acts to halt the arms race, to return to the path of detente and to strengthen peace. As Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov has indicated, we desire a fundamental improvement in international relations and a consolidation and development of all good initiatives in these relations.

Thank you, comrades, for taking part in this roundtable discussion. Thank you, listeners, for your attention. All the best. Goodbye to you!

'INTERNATIONAL SITUATION: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS'

LD110244 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 9 Sep 83

["International Situation -- Questions and Answers" program presented by Yevgeniy Kachanov, All-Union Radio foreign political commentator, with international journalist Eduard Vasilyevich Kovalev, and Bronislav Frantsovich Myakota, political observer of Central Television and All-Union Radio]

KAL Incident

[Excerpts] [Kachanov] Our mail, esteemed comrades, contains as usual many letters whose authors share thoughts about the present world situatior and voice indignation at the policy of the U.S. Administration which has openly embarked on the cold war path. Comrades (Rogov) from Moscow and (Yemin) from Vologda in their letters denounce President Reagan for unleashing a provocative anti-Soviet campaign around the incident with the South Korean plane. It is quite obvious, writes Comrade (Rogov), that the incident with the intruder plane was planned and executed by the American special services with one single aim: under cover of an anti-Soviet hullabaloo to thwart the Geneva talks and deploy their new nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Serious doubt about the sincerity of Washington's statements about its desire for peace" are voiced also by Comrade (Yemin).

Geneva Disarmament Talks

(Yakov Tikhonovich Makarov) from the village of (Privazelye), Penza Oblast. (Zina Zvezdina) from Moscow and Comrade (Sysoyev) from Novosibirsk ask: What are the prospects of a successful completion of the Geneva talks between the USSR and the United States on limiting nuclear armaments in Europe? As you know, comrades, another round of these talks started on 6 September. And so, what baggage have the delegations of both countries brought to the shores of Lake Geneva? I ask this question of a permanent participant in our program, international journalist Eduard Vasilyevich Kovalev:

[Kovalev] In answering this question, Yevgeniy Viktorovich, the following must first of all be said: The Soviet Union has unfailingly pursued and pursues a course to bridle the nuclear arms race on our continent. Throughout the Geneva talks we have continually been displaying a constructive approach and true flexibility. The USSR firmly advocates an agreement. It is the USSR that proposed a real, not spurious, zero option for Europe: to destroy all nuclear facilities, both medium-range and tactical.

Well, the United States does not want to hear about this. All right. If they are not prepared for such a radical solution in the West -- while our readiness for it, let us stress again, remains in force -- the Soviet Union has proposed another far-reaching option for getting the talks moving [razvyazka peregovorov] that of rejecting deployment in Europe of any new medium-range weapons, and reducing all the existing ones by approximately two-thirds, leaving 300 units of these weapons for the time being for the Soviet Union and the NATO side. Finally, in connection with the assertions of Western figures that the option mentioned is unfair as regards the NATO countries, the Soviet Union has agreed to leave exactly as many medium-range missiles as Britain and France have today, following future reductions of nuclear weapons in Europe, that is, 162 missiles.

We have also made further concessions, stating our readiness to come to agreement on equality both in delivery vehicles. As a result the USSR would have in the European zone considerably fewer medium-range missiles and warheads on them than before 1976, when it had no SS-20 missiles, because of which the present dispute allegedly flared up. On the eve of the fresh round of the Geneva talks, the Soviet Union provided yet another convincing proof of goodwill. On 27 August, Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, responding to questions from a PRAVDA correspondent, stated our country's readiness, in the event of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement including U.S. rejection of deployment of its new missiles in Europe, to eliminate the medium-range missiles subject to reduction in the European part of the USSR. Numbered among these would be a considerable proportion of the SS-20 missiles, precisely that proportion which would be over and above the total quantity of the corresponding missiles that Britain and France have.

The exceptional importance of this fresh manifestation of goodwill on the Soviet Union's part is obvious. Firstly, this cuts all the ground from under the assertions being put about in NATO countries that the Soviet Union in fact intends to keep the SS-20 missiles subject to reduction, and simply to move them from Europe to the East. Secondly, the concern expressed by China and Japan about the possibility of such a move is without any foundation.

From what I have said it must be clear to any unprejudiced person that the Soviet Union has been doing and is doing everything in its power to find a way of unravelling things at the talks, to reach mutually acceptable accord there that would avert another extraordinarily dangerous spiral of the nuclear arms race in Europe.

[Kachanov] What can be said, Eduard Vasilyevich, of the Amrican position at the Geneva talks?

[Kovalev] Yevgeniy Viktorovich, American propagandists are publicizing the U.S. position at the Geneva talks as a flexible position that purportedly takes into account to the maximum degree the interests of both sides. What can be said of this? These attempts are vain, these attempts are devoid of backing. The portfolio of the U.S. delegation in Geneva has contained, as you will remember, both the so-called zero option and the so-called interim option. According to the zero option, the United States was demanding that we reduce the zero, destroy all our medium-range missiles, while on the NATO side they would destroy nothing, not a single missile, not a single aircraft. In return for this, the United States would graciously agree not to deploy 572 new missiles in Western Europe. As is to be seen, the sense of all this is: no missiles for the USSR and no reductions for the United States. When this position had shown itself to be completely without a leg to stand on, the so-called interim option was put forward. Let the USSR keep part of its medium-range missiles, but the United States, without making any reductions, would receive in return the right to deploy, in addition to the already existing 162 missiles of France and Britain, new U.S. missiles equal in number to the remaining Soviet missile weapons. Again, that means reductions and disarmament for us, and rearmament [dovooruzheniye] and increase of their nuclear missiles potential for them. One could only call this flexibility in a flout of common sense.

The U.S. State Department reacted to the latest Soviet peace proposals made in August by Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov with altogether spurious reservations which left a bitter taste.

[Kachanov] In a word, Eduard Vasilyevich, one should not hope for progress at Geneva if the present U.S. position is maintained?

[Kovalev] Unfortunately, Yevgeniy Viktorovich, if the American position is maintained the achievement of success will become really extremely doubtful. Effectively sabotaging the Geneva talks, deadlocking them, the Washington Administration is trying at any cost to start deployment at the end of this year of Pershing II and cruise missiles on West German soil and to essentially turn the peoples of the Western part of our continent into nuclear hostages. The deployment of new American nuclear missiles comprises the major part of the efforts the Reagan administration is making to achieve military superiority. These missiles are designed to become a direct and considerable addition to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. They are to change the existing regional and global balance of forces in favor of the West, to the detriment of the Soviet Union. The installation of the missiles would seriously change the situation in Europe, would sharply aggravate the nuclear confrontation, and would increase the risk of war. Of course, if the talks end unsuccessfully and the new American missiles are deployed, then the Soviet Union will inevitably have to take measures in response. As was said at the recent session of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, if anyone is considering, in a situation of tension, to achieve superiority over the USSR, it is a dangerous miscalculation.

It must be stressed quite definitely: The balance of forces will be preserved through our efforts, both on the regional, European, scale, and on the global, world scale. However, it is still not too late to think things over. As was said in the Soviet Government's statement of 28 May this year, it is still not too late to stop the dangerous development of the situation. We are still expressing the hope that the United States and its NATO allies will carefully weigh the consequences that would inevitably be caused by the implementation of their plans to deploy new U.S. missiles in Western Europe.

Certain sober-minded politicians in the West understand well the irrevocable nature of deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles if deployment of them becomes a fait accompli. Hence the conclusion that more time must be given for the talks in Geneva, and that deployment of the new U.S. missiles must be postponed. This opinion is widespread in public and political circles in Europe. It is winning more and more new supporters.

Literally the other day Papandreou, the Greek socialist premier, the leader of a NATO country, made the proposal to postpone for 6 months until summer of 1984 the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles so as to give time in Geneva for calm but active and at the same time purposeful discussion and achievement of the agreement between the sides that is so necessary. Using this postponement a solution should be sought that would make it possible to remove the nuclear threat to the peoples of Europe and halt the continual spiral of the arms race. Although this proposal of the Greek premier was rejected by his allies, and the United States even publicly told him off for weakening the Western alliance, people of good will, peace champions and opponents of nuclear war in Europe and throughout the world are acting and will continue their struggle. While they are fighting, until the dark hour strikes when the deployment of new American nuclear missiles begins, the opportunity is preserved to reach a really honorable agreement taking into account the legitimate interests of both sides, so that instead of a buildup of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe, they may be reduced greatly and by this means signignificantly improve the situation on our continent and throughout the world. Let us repeat once more: Until deployment has begun an agreement is still possible.

Madrid Conference

[Kachanov] Astrakhan listener Comrade (Voltser) wants to know why the Madrid meeting has continued so long, what are the disagreements of its participants and what objections against the final document have been made by Malta.

And now it has taken the delegates to the Madrid meeting exactly 3 years to reach a consensus, i.e., a general agreement of all 35 states participating in the forum. It was 3 years of difficult and complicated talks. Forces were found -- let's be frank about it -- primarily in the United States, which would like to deadlock the Madrid meeting, like the Belgrade one. They tried to stall the process of detente started in Helsinki, to revise some of the 10 articles of the Final Act. Essentially, they tried to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist states. The U.S. delegation -- and this was noted by many Western media mouthpieces -- tried to replace the main subject of debate, cooperation and secur ty, with discussion of imaginary violations of human rights in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

However, it should be noted that the very concept of human rights is filled with different content by states with different socio-political systems. That is why any discussion of this subject naturally cannot be reduced to a common denominator, to mutual agreement. And here it is perhaps not out of place to recall that the Soviet Union voted for the general declaration of human rights of 1948 and signed and ratified the 1966 pacts of economic, social and cultural rights and civil and political rights, while the United States has hitherto not ratified the pacts of 1966 and even the convention of genocide of 1948, and I am not even mentioning the blatant examples of violation of human rights in the United States: racial discrimination, genocide against the Indians, absence of the right to work and housing, the support by Washington for the bloody dictatorships in Chile, El Salvador and Honduras, where thousands of people are deprived of the main human rights, the right to life. The American delegation to the Madrid meeting also opposed the holding of a conference in Stockholm on measures to build confidence and security and disarmament in Europe. The Americans' position had such an openly provocative character that even their West European allies were shocked. A correspondent of the West German newspaper DIE TAT remarked: If the Americans had not agreed to discuss at Madrid questions of disarmament in Europe they would have exposed themselves in the eyes of the whole world as champions of war. A refusal by the U.S. delegation in Madrid to adopt the compromise option drafted with such labor would have served as a fresh spur to the intensification of actions by peaceloving forces.

It was just these considerations that provoked the FRG foreign minister to make a lightning visit to Washington. There he insisted on the signing of the Madrid document because without it, the West German journalist remarks, the Kolh government would have found itself powerless in the struggle for the deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles.

As for the Malta delegation, it also signed the final document, agreeing to the proposal to convoke a special conference on the security of Mediterranean countries. Consensus in Madrid was preceded by a long 3-year path. Now, as Comrade Gromyko said, there is no need to go over all the ups and downs suffered by the Madrid meeting during its work. The principal thing is that its participants managed to overcome disagreement and achieve agreement. The outcome of the Madrid meeting once more confirms that the reserve of the policy of detente are far from exhausted. The concrete steps agreed in Madrid can promote its dynamic continuation and development.

U.S., France in Chad

Radio listeners (Lipatov) and (Rusakov) from Leningrad, (Volbert) from Astrakhan, (Pavlovskaya) from Ternopol ask us to talk about the situation in the Republic of Chad. (Irina Leonidovna Pavlovskaya) in particular would like to hear about how the United States is exerting pressure on France to get it to send its troops to Chad. I am asking political observer of Central Television and All-Union Radio, Bronislav Frantsovich Myakota, to reply to this and other questions connected with the situation in Chad.

[Myakota] Esteemed comrades, it has been reported more than once both in our and the foreign press that the White House has been and is exerting pressure on France to get the latter to interfere actively in the internal affairs of Chad. President Mitterrand of France, for example, spoke in an interview to LE MONDE about Reagan's increasing pressure. The pressure was exerted in the messages that almost daily were being sent from Washington to Paris. In public utterances the Reagan administration also declared more than once that it was expecting France to play a leading role in Chad, that relations between Washington and Paris would become clouded if the French Government refused to take forceful steps in Chad. It can be said quite definitely that the United States was indeed pushing France toward interference in Chadian affairs. Having yielded to this pressure and sent its interventionist troops to Chad, the Government of France found itself in a fairly complex situation. On the one hand, Paris did not resist the temptation to consolidate its positions in the center of the African continent, and for this it used the old colonial recipes of resolving all problems with the aid of armed strength. On the other hand, the present government, which sharply criticized the policy of its predecessor in Africa, to some extent found it awkward to resort to the former punitive methods against which it had been speaking quite recently. After all, such a course is fraught with grave losses both externally and the internally. So, because of these circumstances, France increased its interference in Chad gradually, as if looking over its shoulder at public opinion. However, this did not prevent it from increasing the numbers of its interventionist forces to over 3,500. These are crack units of paratroopers and marines, many of whom have dug in at a position along the 15th parallel dividing Chad into north and south. The occupiers' combat might is constantly being built up. Thus, for example, 15-ton AMX-10 tanks are already being moved into Chad. They are equipped with complex up-to-date instruments, including laser devices to aim 150mm guns. The interventionist forces are equipped with low-flying Jaguar attack aircraft, Mirage fighter-bombers, missiles of various sorts and other kinds of the latest machinery which it intends to test for the first time in battle conditions. It is significant that sub-detachments of the French Foreign Legion, known for its punitive actions in Africa, have been transferred to Chad. Thus it was that this legion in 1978 took part in military action in Zaire. The legion is the world's biggest formation of mercenaries. People are enlisted into it for 5 years at least. The recruits are not asked many questions, and therefore the legionaires are often called men without a past. And so, today these men without a past are in the front line, and over their heads there are French Jaguars and Mirages bearing bombs, missiles and shells which are then hurled at the positions of the troops of the Transitional Government of National Unity [GUNT] of Goukouni Oueddei. The participation of the French Air Force in military action on the side of the Habre regime, which is confirmed even by the Western press, shows that foreign interference in the affairs of Chad has assumed an even more dangerous scale, whereas quite recently Paris was stating that its soldiers were being sent to Chad merely as instructors, that French units would engage in battle only in the event of their being attacked. There has been nothing reported about an attack on French troops, but the interventionists' air force has already entered into battle action. As for the United States itself, in whipping up tension in Chad and around it, it is striving to create a hotbed of direct menace to Libya, whose consistent anti-imperialist policy has long been provoking malice and hatred on the part of Washington. The increased foreign interference in the affairs of Chad is causing justified alarm in independent Africa. The OAU has come out with a demand that all foreign intrigues against the Republic of Chad be halted, and that the Chadians themselves be given the opportunity to settle their problems by peaceful means. The GUNT of Goukouni Oueddei has more than once argued in favor of halting the bloodshed and starting talks. The Ndjamena authorities reject these proposals. They are still counting on resolving an internal conflict with the aid of interventionists. But this, as life shows, is a course leading to a dead end, which will bring the people of Chad nothing but new victims and sufferings.

Warsaw Pact, NATO Negotiations

[Kachanov] [Nikolay Onufriyevich Makarenko), a war veteran from Chelyabinsk Oblast, asks in his letter: Are negotiations possible between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO on questions of disarmament?

Let us note at once that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies are sincerely concerned over the fate of the world and have frequently proposed to the NATO states that we sit down at the negotiating table. And, precisely at the initiative of our country, negotiations began 10 years ago in Vienna on mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe. During the talks, thanks to the efforts made mainly by the socialist states, which put forth approximately 20 proposals all together both of a general and a particular nature, the original positions of the negotiating partners drew substantially closer. And yet, the Vienna talks cannot yet provide tangible results, although practically everything that is necessary for a successful conclusion of work on the agreement for the first stage is on the table in the fortress hall of Hofburg Palace. The limits of the areas of reduction have been clearly marked, for example. These embrace the territory of the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as the FRG, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. The circle of states whose forces and arms are subject to reduction and limitation has been defined. Together with the abovementioned countries, the USSR, United States, Britain, and Canada are included, for they have forces of their own in Central Europe. If an agreement is finally concluded, in the first stage the USSR and the United States will cut back and remove within 1 year to within their national national borders 20,000 and 13,000 officers and men of their respective land forces, together with all their weapons and combat equipment. At the same time the total amount of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be frozen for the 3-year period in which the first agreement would be effective. Such measures, in particular, are envisaged by the draft submitted in February by the Polish delegation on behalf of the USSR, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. This carefully balanced draft contains all the components needed to achieve a mutually-acceptable accord, and takes into account the legitimate interests of the security of both sides. The ultimate goal of such an agreement would be a reduction of the total number of service personnel of each alliance to equal collective levels of 900,000 men.

A natural question arises: What is preventing the agreement from being signed? As before, this turns on the position of the West, which, alas, is not showing the required political readiness to reach a final agreement on reducing the level of armed confrontation in Central Europe. As a brake, the NATO delegates are using, as it were, a barrier of figures. They dispute without foundation the number of Warsaw Pact servicemen in the reduction region. They set forth their own exaggerated assessments. What is worse, it emerges that the Western experts cannot even specify the numbers of their own armies. The differences in their calculations come to almost 140,000 men, an error exceeding any reasonable statistical tolerance. Putting it briefly, the NATO side will adopt any ploy if it can drag out the talks even longer, and already they are sometimes called the Vienna marathon. In spite of the complexity, which must be acknowledged, of the questions being discussed in the Austrian capital, we have long been about to cross the time-limit beyond which tangible results should ensue -- the new round beginning this month will be the 31st. The more so as the problems related to the conclusion of the first agreement are fully capable of solution without further dispute over figures. This agreement, if signed, would undoubtedly have great and positive significance in the present inflamed international situation. The time has come to take responsible decisions. This is perfectly understood by the Warsaw Pact states and reinforced by their actions. In June this year they introduced another draft for an all-encompassing agreement on mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe. Now, as never before, it is up to the NATO countries. It depends on them whether the Vienna marathon reached the finish line.

DEFENSE, FOREIGN MINISTRIES HOLD PRESS CONFERENCE

TASS Reports Details

LD091334 Moscow TASS in English 1303 GMT 9 Sep 83

[Text] Moscow September 9 TASS -- A press conference was held at the press centre of the USSR Foreign Ministry today. Taking part in it were Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and first deputy defence minister of the USSR, Georgiy Korniyenko, first deputy foreign minister of the USSR, and Leonid Zamyatin, head of the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

Marshal Ogarkov made a detailed statement concerning a provocation staged by U.S. special services in the Soviet Far East on the night of September 1, 1983.

Answering a question from a correspondent of the newspaper PRAVDA if the U.S. Government has explained the fact of the appearance of a South Korean plane in the Soviet Union's airspace, Georgiy Korniyenko said: First of all, I should point out that the U.S. Government has recognised the fact that a most flagrant violation of the Soviet Union's airspace has taken place.

However, Washington, Georgiy Korniyenko went on to say, has to this very day failed to provide the answer to a single legitimate question arising in conjuction with that. Why did the South Korean plane, upon leaving the United States, soon veer off the established international route by nearly 500 kilometers toward the Soviet Union's territory, not toward the ocean, at that?

Why, if it were an ordinary passenger flight, did not the U.S. navigation services, which control air traffic in the zone for which they are responsible, sound the alarm as soon as the plane left the path allocated to it and headed for the Soviet Union's territory. It it impossible that they knew nothing about it, which follows from Marshal Ogarkov's statement.

Why, Georgiy Korniyenko said further, did they fail to notify the Soviet Union if the plane was heading there not on instructions from U.S. intelligence services. Why did the path of the plane's flight over the Soviet Union's territory pass above the area where major military installations are situated, and not elsewhere. Why did the crew of the plane fly it violating air navigation rules. Why did not they react to all the efforts of Soviet air defense systems, both ground and airborne, to come into contact (with them)?

Similar questions which we could have addressed to the Japanese side remain unanswered as well. Why did not the Japanese air traffic control authorities fail to sound alarm when the plane, if it were an ordinary one, failed to turn up on time in the proper place in the zone for which they are responsible?

Why did neither the U.S. nor the Japanese authorities contact the Soviet side to give some explanations concerning the situation that had taken shape to prevent a tragedy?

Answers to these and many other questions should be given, and not only to us but the whole world as well, by those, who are trying to maintain that it was an ordinary flight of an ordinary commercial airliner. But they do not answer these questions because it was no ordinary flight.

A correspondent of the newspaper LA LIBRE BELGIQUE asked: Who, when and through which channels approached the Soviet side in connection with the incident involving the South Korean plane?

Answering this question, Georgiy Korniyenko said that from the moment of the plane's take-off from Anchorage, soon after which it left the international route to fly towards the Soviet Union and then intruded into its airspace, and till the moment of its disappearance, nobody, neither the U.S., nor the Japanese side nor anybody else, approached us through any channels.

Another ten hours went by, and it was only after that that a deputy secretary of state in Washington and the U.S. charge d'affaires ad interim in Moscow simultaneously approached us, inquiring if we know anything about the plane's destiny.

We were told then by Deputy State Secretary Burt, and I want to make particular stress on this, that, according to data of U.S. tracking stations, this aircraft has got lost somewhere in the area of Sakhalin. Burt's references to the data of the U.S. tracking stations in the first approach to us completely refute the positon, assumed by U.S. officials later, of denying that U.S. services specially followed its flight over the territory of the Soviet Union, and their claims that the picture of what has happened, as they draw it, was, allegedly, reconstructed on the basis of data from other sources.

The U.S. charge d'affaires in Moscow in his first approach to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned the fact that radio communications with the plane were maintained till the last moment. When telling this, however, and giving the correct approximate time and place of the plane's disappearance, he declared in the same breath that the radio contact was lost when the plane was in a spot located some 600 kilometres from the place where the aircraft had really disappeared.

As we see, from the very beginning and to this hour the U.S. side have not been able to make their story hold water, and it would not hold water for the simple reason that they do not want to tell the truth, do not want to confess what they have perpetrated.

A correspondent for America's ABC Television Network asked why after tracking the plane for two and a half hours the pilot failed to detect that it was a Boeing 747, and why the Soviet Union decided to terminate the flight of that plane.

The Soviet Government statement published in the press, Marshal Ogarkov said, makes a clear indication as to why that plane was dealt with for two hours and a half. At the same time this confirms once again that the Soviet side was making every possible effort to land the plane at one of the Soviet airfields and to find what the matter was. But it stubbornly ignored all warnings of the Soviet plane and did not want to establish any contacts. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that it acted exactly like the crew (of the plane) of the same South Korean airline when it violated the Soviet Union's air space in 1978 in the area of Korelia.

It was the same hand. The Soviet Union made everything possible to land at an airfield but it would not comply. Moreover, it kept maneuvering, it was side-tracking, it was trying to escape from Soviet fighters, it was side-tracking the zone of anti-aircraft missile forces. After all options had been exhausted an order was issued and the Soviet airmen fulfilled their duty.

One of the Japanese correspondents asked what could be said concerning allegations that the intruder-plane was downed outside the Soviet Union's air space?

This is not true, said Marshal Ogarkov, answering this question. The order to terminate the flight was issued at 06.24 local time over the Soviet Union's territory in the area of Pravda settlement on the south-west coast of the Island of Sakhalin. The order was fulfilled over the Soviet territory.

After that the intruder plane continued a descending flight for some time, and then radar aids lost contact with it and could observe it no longer.

The Soviet air defence systems, Marshal Ogarkov continued, acted strictly in accordance with the Law of the State Border of the USSR. The decision to terminate the flight was taken by the command of the air defence district.

IZVESTIYA's political analyst asked how the role of the U.S. reconnaissance plane RC-135 was viewed. Answering this question, Marshal Ogarkov quoted a statement by the Pentagon's official spokesman, who had said that an RC-135 reconnaissance plane had been in the area of the violation of Soviet airspace by the South Korean plane in order to test the potentialities of the Soviet air defence system.

We think that was far from the only aim, the marshal said. Both planes, as we see from the map of the flight plotted by our radar facilities, acted concertedly. Their flights were performed so as to complicate and confuse the situation for our air defence system. In addition, the RC-135 must have been controlling the flight of the Boeing 747 at the initial stage and recording the actions of the Soviet air defence system in this connection.

Answering a question from a TASS correspondent, Leonid Zamyatin emphasized that the timing of the anti-Soviet provocation was not accidental. The public throughout the world is now looking forward to a radical solution of major problems, which affect the entire mankind, including the solution of the problems related to halting the arms race, securing substantial reductions of nuclear missile weapons and lowering the level of confrontation between strategic nuclear forces. All this demands the defusion of tension. But the Reagan administration's practical actions aim to aggravate the international situation even further and to press in this tense international situation for the manufacture of new types of weapons of mass annihilation, the very weapons which the Soviet Union proposes should be reduced. The Reagan administration wants to accumulate them in order to gain superiority over the Soviet Union and dictate to it its will and its policy in various parts of the world.

The Soviet leaders have already declared, Leonid Zamyatin said further, that the USSR will not allow this superiority to be achieved. The U.S. Administration needs tension in order to begin in December to implement its plans of deploying eurostrategic missiles, and it (tension) has eased of late. Now it is being artifically whipped up by those, who send a plane into our airspace in the hope that they will be able either to attain essential military goals, the goals of intelligence gathering, by means of this action or to use it for mounting propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union and sowing hatred towards the Soviet Union.

Acting in [word indistinct], Leonid Zamyatin said, the United States would like to shatter trust in the Soviet peace initiatives, in all that our country is doing to strengthen peace. Such are the aims pursued by those who have engineered this provocation. The moment for it was chosen purposefully -- both timewise and with regard to the political situation. All the subsequent actions of the U.S. Administration confirm this.

Answering the question as to why it was precisely the United States that was the noisiest in clamoring over the incident with the South Korean airliner which had violated the Soviet Union's air space, and was threatening sanctions, Georgiy Korniyenko said that in that case an old and primitive method was being used -- the culprit raised the noisiest outcry over what had happened to absolve itself of suspicion.

The entire analysis of the South Korean plane's behavior, Marshal Ogarkov said, the path and the character of its flight, the analysis of the plane's behavior vis-a-vis other planes in the zone of Kamchatka as well as the choice of the paths in the direction of major Soviet defense installations, by-passing zones of air defense missile emplacements, and lastly, such totally uncomprehensible behavior for an ordinary plane, just as the complete ignoring of all the warnings of the country whose air space it had violated -- all this could not but convince us that we were dealing with a reconnaissance plane. At that time the opinion at all the command posts of the air defense systems was unanimous that we were dealing with a reconnaissance plane, the marshal said in conclusion.

TASS on Questions, Answers

LD091352 Moscow TASS in English 1333 GMT 9 Sep 83

["A Press Conference in Moscow" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow September 9 TASS -- A press conference, organised by the USSR Defense Ministry and the USSR Foreign Ministry, was held for Soviet and foreign journalists here today.

Taking part in it were Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and first deputy defence minister of the USSR, Georgiy Korniyenko, first deputy foreign minister of the USSR, and Leonid Zamyatin, head of the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

Marshal Ogarkov made a statement at the press conference.

Then the Soviet officials answered questions from journalists.

Question: What do you think was the role of the U.S. reconnaissance plane RC-135 the presence of which on the course of the intruder plane was confirmed by U.S. officials? What special mission could be meant in the case?

Answer: The Pentagon's spokesman officially admitted that an RC-135 reconnaissance plane was in the area of the violation of Soviet airspace by the South Korean plane with the aim to test the capabilities of the Soviet air defense system. We believe that that was not the only aim. Both planes acted concertedly. Their flights were performed so as to complicate the air situation and to confuse our air defence systems. In addition, the RC-135 must have been controlling the initial stage of the flight of the Boeing 747 and keeping track of the actions of our air defence system at that time.

Question: Is a search conducted in the area where the plane fell? Does the Soviet side intend to hand over personal effects and other collected items?

Answer: Yes, a search is conducted by the USSR, Japan, and the United States. The collected personal effects and items will be handed over according to established procedures.

Question: Could you dwell in greater detail on the number of air defence fighter planes used for the intercept and their actions?

Answer: Four air defence fighters were scrambled over Kamchatka. They operated from 20:37 to 21:08 Moscow time on August 31, that is, up to the time the intruder plane left the area of Kamchatka toward the southwest.

Six air defence planes were scrambled over Sakhalin. They operated from 21:42 to 22:28.

All those planes are fitted out with communications facilities incorporating the international emergency frequency, 121.5 mc. They repeatedly tried to contact the intruder in that frequency. But the intruder did not respond.

Question: What can you say about the pronouncements to the effect that the intruder-plane was shot out of the sky outside the Soviet Union's air space?

Answer: This does not correspond to reality. After the crews of air defense fighters had reported that the intruder plane was not complying with their commands and continuing its flight, a fighter was ordered at 06:24 hours, local time, to launch a missile, which was fired at the moment when the intruder plane was above Sakhalin Island northeast of the Point Pravda.

Question: Have there been earlier violations of the Soviet Union's air space in the Far East?

Answer: Yes, there have been such violations. In 1983 alone U.S. planes repeatedly violated the boundary of the Soviet Union's air space in that region, including in the area of the Lesser Kuril Chain, by U.S. naval planes from "Midway" and "Enterprise" aircraft carriers, going up to 30 kilometers deep, and by civilian U.S. planes in the area of Chukotka.

The Soviet Union lodged official protests with the U.S. side over these instances, however, there was no due reaction to them.

Question: Does the Soviet Union intend to take part in the work of the ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] Council to be convened in connection with what has happened?

Answer: The Soviet Union is a member of the ICAO. We have a permanent representative at this organisation, and he will participate in the work of the ICAO Council. As to our position, including at the ICAO, it has been explicitly set forth in the Soviet Government's statement.

Question: Has the U.S. Government provided an explanation of the South Korean plane's appearance in the Soviet Union's airspace?

Answer: First of all, the U.S. Government has recognised the fact that a most flagrant violation of the Soviet Union's airspace has taken place. But Washington has still not given an answer to any of the legitimate questions arising in this connection. Why did the South Korean plane, after flying out of the United States, soon went nearly 500 kilometres off the established international route in the direction of the USSR's territory?

Why, if it had been an ordinary passenger flight, did the U.S. navigation services, which control air traffic in the zone for which they are responsible, not sound the alarm as soon as the plane had left the path allocated to it and headed for the Soviet Union's territory? It is impossible that they knew nothing about it.

Why did they fail to notify the Soviet Union if the plane was heading there not on instructions from U.S. intelligence services. Why did the path of the plane's flight over the Soviet Union's territory pass over the area where major military installations are situated, and not elsewhere. Why did the crew of the plane fly it violating air navigation rules. Why did they not react to all the efforts of Soviet air defense systems, both ground and airborne, to come into contact (with them)?

Similar questions which we could have addressed to the Japanese side remain unanswered as well. Why did not the Japanese air traffic control authorities sound alarm when the plane, if it were an ordinary one, failed to turn up on time in the proper place in the zone for which they are responsible?

Why did neither the U.S. nor the Japanese authorities contact the Soviet side to give some explanations concerning the situation that had taken shape to prevent a tragedy?

Answers to these and many other questions should be given, and not only to use but the whole world as well, by those, who are trying to maintain that it was an ordinary flight of an ordinary commercial airliner. But they do not answer these questions because it was no ordinary flight.

Question: Who, when and through which channels approached the Soviet side in connection with the incident involving the South Korean plane?

Answer: From the very moment of the plane's departure from Anchorage, soon after which it left the international route to fly towards the Soviet Union and then intruded into its airspace, and till the moment of its disappearance, nobody, neither the U.S., or the Japanese side nor anybody else, approached us through any channels.

Another ten hours went by, and it was only after that that a deputy secretary of state in Washington and the U.S. charge d'affairs ad interim in Moscow simultaneously approached us, inquiring if we knew anything about the plane's destiny.

We were told then by Undersecretary of State Burt that, according to the data of U.S. tracking stations, this aircraft had got lost somewhere in the area of Sakhalin. Burt's references to the data of the U.S. tracking stations in the first approach to us completely refute the position, assumed by U.S. officials later, the position of denying that U.S. services specially followed its flight over the territory of the Soviet Union, and their claims that the picture of what had happened, as they draw it, was, allegedly, reconstructed on the basis of data from other sources.

The U.S. charge d'affaires in Moscow in his first approach to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned the fact that radio communications with the plane had maintained till the last moment. When telling this, however, and giving the correct approximate time and place of the plane's disappearance, he declared in the same breath that the radio contact was lost when the plane was over a spot, which is located some 600 kilometres away from the place where the aircraft really disappeared.

As we see, from the very beginning and to this hour the U.S. side have not been able to make their story hold water, and it have not held water for the simple reason that they do not want to tell the truth, do not want to confess what they have perpetrated.

Question: Why did after tracking the plane for two and a half hours the pilot fail to detect that it was a Boeing 747, and why did the Soviet Union decide to terminate the flight of that plane.

Answer: The Soviet Government statement makes a clear indication as to why the plane was being dealt with for two hours and a half. At the same time this confirms once again that the Soviet side was making every possible effort to land the plane at one of the Soviet airfields and to find what the matter was. But it stubbornly ignored all warnings of the Soviet plane and did not want to establish any contacts. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that it acted exactly like the crew (of the plane) of the same South Korean airline when it violated the Soviet Union's air space in 1978 in the area of Karelia.

It was the same hand. The Soviet Union made everything possible to land it at an airfield but it would not comply. Moreover, it kept maneuvering, it was trying to escape from Soviet fighters, it was bypassing the zones of anti-aircraft missile forces. After all options had been exhausted an order was issued and the Soviet airmen fulfilled their duty.

Question: Was the timing of the dispatch of the intruder plane accidental?

Answer: The timing of this anti-Soviet provocation was not accidental. The public throughout the world is now looking forward to a radical solution of major problems, which affect the entire mankind, including the solution of the problems related to halting the arms race, securing substantial reductions of nuclear missile weapons and lowering the level of confrontation between strategic nuclear forces. All this demands the defusion of tension. But the Reagan administration's plans pursue totally different aims. The Reagan administration's practical actions aim to aggravate the international situation even further and to press in this tense international situation for the manufacture of new types of weapons of mass annihilation the very weapons which the Soviet Union proposes should be reduced. The Reagan administration wants to accumulate them in order to gain superiority over the Soviet Union and dictate to it its will and its policy in various parts of the world.

The Soviet leaders have already declared that the USSR will not allow this superiority to be achieved. The U.S. Administration needs tension in order to begin in December to implement its plans of deploying Eurostrategic missiles. And it (tension) has eased of late. Now it is being artificially whipped up by those who send a plane into our airspace in the hope that they will be able to either to attain essential military goals, the goals of intelligenc gathering, by means of this action or to use it for mounting propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union and sowing hatred towards the Soviet Union.

Acting in this way the United States would like to shatter trust in the Soviet peace initiatives, in all that our country is doing to strengthen peace. Such are the aims pursued by those who have engineered this provocation. The moment for it was chosen purposefully -- both timewise and with regard to the political situation. All the subsequent actions of the U.S. administration confirm this.

Question: Why is it precisely the United States that is the noisest in clamoring over the incident with the South Korean airliner which violated the Soviet Union's air space, and is threatening sanctions?

Answer: In this case an old and primitive method is being used -- the culprit raises the noisiest outcry over what happened to absolve itself of suspicion.

The analysis of the South Korean plane's behavior, the path and the character of its flight, the analysis of the plane's behavior vis-a-vis other planes in the zone of Kamchatka as well as the choice of the paths in the direction of major Soviet defense installations by-passing zones of air defense missile emplacements, and lastly, such totally uncomprehensible behavior for an ordinary plane, just as the complete ignoring of all the warnings of the country whose air space it had violated -- all this could not but convince us that we were dealing with a reconnaissance plane.

Moscow Radio on Ogarkov Statement

LD091846 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 9 Sep 83

[Text] A press conference, organized by the USSR Defense Ministry and the USSR Foreign Ministry, was held for Soviet and foreign journalists in Moscow today.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister; Georgiy Korniyenko, USSR first deputy foreign minister, and Leonid Zamyatin, chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Information Department, took part in it.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Ogarkov made a statement at the press conference. He said, in part:

[Begin Ogarkov recording] The nature of the provocation perpetrated by the U.S. special services in the Soviet Far East on the night of September 1 and the character of the actions taken in this connection by the Soviet Air Defense Forces were presented with utmost clarity in the statement of the Soviet Government on September 6 and in a TASS report made earlier on instructions from the government.

In view of the importance of what took place, the Soviet Government established on the same day a special highly competent state commission. The commisssion has produced a report. I rely in my statement on the facts and conclusions presented by the commission.

It has been proved irrefutable that the intrusion of the plane of the South Korean airlines into Soviet airspace was a deliberately, thoroughly planned intelligence operation. It was directed from certain centers in the territory of the United States and Japan. A civilian plane was chosen for its deliberately, disregarding or, possibly, counting on loss of human life. Hence all the grave consequences of this extraordinary "incident," as it is referred to in the Western press. Naturally, all responsibility for what happened rests wholly and fully on its organizers.

Soon after the plane took off from the stopover airfield at Anchorage, Alaska, it did not follow the established international route but assumed a course toward Kamchatka. By the moment it was picked up by our radar systems it had already veered close on 500 km off course. But over that time the flight was proceeding within the visibility range of the radar aids of the U.S. air traffic control service and the air defense system of the United States. In such conditions they could not either lose the plane or fail to notice such a great deflection from the established international route. Such a possibility is ruled out. Then the question arises: Why did they not rectify this mistake if the case in point was a usual airliner on a scheduled flight? To this very day the United States has failed to answer this question.

I particularly want to draw your attention to the fact that the plane entered the zone covered by Soviet radar systems precisely in the area which is constantly patrolled by American reconnaissance aircraft, specifically RC-135 planes. An American RC-135 intelligence plane in the area this time was on a somewhat strange standing patrol [barrazhirovaniye]. Another plane was detected in the same region and at roughly the same height -- about 8,000 meters. At 0500 the planes approached each other -- up to the total convergence of the blips on the screen -- and flew together for some time. Then one of them headed for Alaska, while the second aircraft, instead of maintaining a standing patrol, headed straight for Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. Naturally, the conclusion was made at Soviet Air Defense Command posts: An intelligence plane is approaching the USSR's airspace.

It was heading straight towards a major base of the USSR's strategic nuclear forces. It did not respond to any inquiries by Soviet ground control and air defense planes. At the same time, radio monitoring stations detected periodically transmitted brief coded signals, which are usually used for transmitting intelligence data.

During that period actions of the Air Defense Forces were directed exclusively at establishing contact with the plane and at compelling it to land at the nearest Soviet airfield.

The third stage is actions in the area of Sakhalin Island. The actions of the plane here became outrageous. As was announced earlier, it had not responded to the warning signals of Soviet interceptor planes. Moreover, it began to change simultaneously the direction, altitude and speed of flight, obviously trying to evade the air defense planes. It was rather characteristic that the intruder plane sharply changed its course and undertook a circumvention of the positions of our air defense missile units, passing over important military facilities in the southern part of Sakhalin Island. There remained no doubts that a reconnaissance plane was in the air.

The last attempt was made to force the violator to land on a Soviet airfield, for which purpose four bursts of warning shots were fired from guns with tracer shells: a total of 120 shells were fired. Since even after that the intruder plane did not obey the demands but tried to escape, taking a general course towards Vladivostok, an interceptor plane was given the order to stop this flight, an order which was fulfilled.

In conclusion I will allow myself to draw your attention that all the events both over Kamchatka and over the Island of Sakhalin were taking place in the dead of night and under conditions of a cloud cover along the upper edge of which the intruder was flying. Its flight was stopped. Moreover, this was done only after the Soviet Air Defense Forces had used every warning measure possible under those conditions. Their actions were carried out in strict conformity with the constitution and the law on the state border of the USSR and with the existing international regulations. It is the sovereign right of every state to defend its borders, including its airspace. [end recording]

Then Comrades Ogarkov, Korniyenko and Zamyatin replied to questions put by Soviet and foreign journalists. A fuller account of the press conference is being published in tomorrow's papers.

Intervision Carries Press Conference

LD100729 Moscow Intervision in Russian 1100 GMT 9 Sep 83

[Press conference arranged by the USSR Defense and Foreign Ministries for Soviet and foreign journalists on 9 September in Moscow with Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and first deputy minister of defense; Georgiy Korniyenko, first deputy minister of foreign affairs; and Leonid Zamyatin, head of the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee, preceded by a statement read by Marshal Ogarkov -- live]

[Text] [Ogarkov] The nature of the provocation perpetrated by the U.S. special services in the Soviet Far East on the night of 1 September and the character of the actions taken in this connection by the Soviet Air Defense Forces were presented with utmost clarity in the statement of the Soviet Government on 6 September and in a TASS statement made earlier on instructions from the government.

Today we are giving a press conference with due account of the findings of a careful investigation of all the circumstances of what happened conducted by the Soviet side. I must say frankly that, in view of the importance of what took place, the Soviet Government established on the same day a special highly competent state commission. It included responsible specialists and experts of different departments, in particular, the state aviation inspectorate of the USSR (Gosavianadzor). The commission has produced a report. I rely in my statement today on the facts and conclusions presented by the commission.

It has been irrefutably proved that the intrusion of the plane of the South Korean airlines into Soviet airspace was a deliberate, thoroughly planned intelligence operation. It was directed from certain centers in the territory of the United States and Japan. A civilian plane was chosen for it deliberately, disregarding or, possibly, counting on loss of human life. Hence all the grave consequences of this extraordinary incident, as it is referred to in the Western press. Naturally, all responsibility for what happened rests wholly and fully on its organizers.

Now allow me to go over to factual data on successive stages of the provocative flight.

The first stage is the beginning of the flight. Soon after the plane took off from the stopover airfield at Anchorage, Alaska, it did not follow the established international route but assumed a course toward Kamchatka. By the moment it was picked up by our radar systems at a point 800 kilometers northeast of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka, it had already veered close to 500 kilometers off course. But over that time the flight was proceeding within the visibility range of the radar equipment of the U.S. air traffic control service and the air defense system of the United States. In such conditions they could not possibly either lose the plane or fail to notice such a great deviation from the established international route. Such a possibility is ruled out. Then the question arises: Why did they not rectify this error if the case in point was a usual aircraft on a scheduled flight? To this very day the United States has failed to answer this question.

Further, the said international route is well known to be equipped with modern, extremely advanced flight support radio equipment. About 12,000 planes fly this route every year. Flight control on that route is the responsibility of U.S. air traffic control services on the stretch from Alaska to the traverse of the southern tip of Kamchatka and, after that point on, of Japan.

The route has special check points (?Battle), Nebi, Neevi, Nippi, etc. Over each of them every aircraft is obliged -- I repeat, obliged -- to fix its position on this and report it to the control centers on the ground -- in the case in question, to Shemya and Alaska, while the ground service should strictly monitor the passage of aircraft over these control points. The question is: Why then, faced with the absence of such reports from the South Korean aircraft about its passing the established check points -- in fact, faced with the absence of the aircraft itself from the route -- did the American and Japanese ground services not sound the alarm even though they were obliged to do this? To date no answer has been provided to this question either.

I want to further draw your attention particularly to the fact that the aircraft entered the zone covered by Soviet radar systems precisely at a point which is generally patrolled by American reconnaissance aircraft, specifically RC-135 planes. On this occasion an American intelligence aircraft RC-135 was detected at this point -- on this inset map there is a printout of that region -- at 0245 Kamchatka time on 1 September. As recorded by Soviet radar systems, it spent 2 hours here carrying out a somewhat strange patrol. At 0451 a second plane was detected in the same region and at roughly the same height -- about 8,000 meters. At 0500 the planes approached each other up to the total convergence of the blips on the radar screen and flew together on this stretch for some time, about 10 minutes. Then one of them, as was repeatedly observed earlier, swung away and headed for Alaska, while the second aircraft, instead of patrolling, headed straight for Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. Naturally, the conclusion was made at Soviet anti-aircraft defense command posts: An intelligence aircraft is approaching the Soviet Union's airspace. The suggestion arises: How can this be a question of a mistake in this case? It is perfectly evident that this aircraft's flight was being controlled, I would say precisely controlled. And therefore this flight was premeditated.

The second stage is actions of the intruding aircraft above Kamchatka. At 0530 local time the intruder aircraft approached Kamchatka. It was heading straight toward a major base of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces. You can see this on the diagram. It did not respond to any inquiries by Soviet ground control and air defense planes. At the same time, radio monitoring stations detected periodically transmitted, brief, coded signals, which are usually used for transmitting intelligence data.

During that period the actions of the antiaircraft defense forces were directed exclusively at establishing contact with the aircraft, including with the help of general call signals at the fixed international distress frequency of 121.5 MHz both from the ground and from interceptor planes, and compelling it to land at the nearest Soviet airfield. But these attempts failed. The intruder flew off towards the Sea of Okhotsk.

The third stage is actions in the area of the Sakhalin Island. The actions of the aircraft here became outrageous. As was announced earlier, it had not responded to the warning signals of Soviet interceptor planes. Moreover, it began to change simultaneously the direction, altitude and speed of flight, obviously trying to evade the Soviet air defense planes. It was extremely characteristic that at 0602 Sakhalin time the intruder aircraft, as shown on the diagram, sharply changed its course and circumvented the positions of our air defense missile units, passing over important military facilities in the southern part of Sakhalin Island. There remained no doubts that a reconnaissance aircraft was in the air.

When the intruder aircraft reached the southwestern part of Sakhalin Island, the last attempt was made to force the intruder to land on a Soviet airfield, for which purpose four bursts of warning shots were fired from guns with tracer shells, a total of 120 shells, at 0620 Sakhalin time. Since even after that the intruder aircraft did not obey the demands but tried to escape, taking a general course towards Vladivostok, at 0642 Sakhalin time an interceptor plane was given the order to stop this flight with air-launched missiles, an order which was indeed fulfilled.

The American side is now trying in every way to prove that the Soviets, supposedly from the outset -- I am quoting -- set themselves the aim to deliberately destroy a civilian airliner. But this is an absurdity. If this aim had indeed been set by the Soviet side, we could have destroyed the intruder many times over and with certainty when it was over Kamchatka, even without scrambling fighter planes but with air defense missiles known in the United States as SAM-5, having a range of over 200 km, through the zone of action of which the intruder plane was passing at that time.

In conclusion I will allow myself to draw your attention to the fact that all the events both over Kamchatka and over the Island of Sakhalin were taking place in the dead of night and under a cloud along the upper edge of which the intruder aircraft was flying. Its flight was cut short, as has already been said above, at 0624 Sakhalin time, whereas the dawn on that day broke at 0711. Moreover, this was done only after the Soviet Air Defense Forces had used every warning measure possible under those conditions. Their actions were carried out in strict conformity with the constitution and the law on the state border of the USSR and with the existing international regulations. It is the sovereign right of every state to defend its borders, including its airspace.

The Soviet Armed Forces, standing guard over the peaceful work of the Soviet people, are constantly in high combat readiness. Throughout the history of the Soviet state they have been discharging their duties with honor. In future, if need be, they will also perform their combat tasks.

[Zamyatin] Thank you very much. There is a multitude of questions. Allow me to read some of these questions and to ask Comrade Korniyenko to reply to them. A question from Mikhaylov, member of the PRAVDA Editorial Board. Has the U.S. Administration in its correspondence with the Soviet Government given an explanation of the fact of the appearance of the South Korean aircraft in the Soviet Union's airspace?

[Korniyenko] First of all, I should say that the U.S. Administration did admit the fact that a most flagrant violation of the Soviet Union's airspace had taken place. However, Washington has not given -- to this very day has not given -- an answer to even one of the questions that legitimately arise in connection with this. One would like to ask: Why did the South Korean aircraft, having left the United States, soon deviate from the set international route by almost 500 km, moreover, not in the direction of the Pacific Ocean, but in the direction of the USSR's territory? Why, if it were an ordinary passenger flight, did the aviation services, the U.S. aviation services which control their zone of responsibility for flights of planes not sound the alarm as soon as that plane left the corridor allocated to it and started to fly in the direction of the Soviet territory?

They could not have been unaware of this, and that is clear from the statement made by Comrade Ogarkov. Why did they then fail to notify the Soviet Union of this, if it had been heading there not on instructions from the U.S. intelligence services?

Why did the route of the flight of that aircraft over the Soviet territory pass precisely over the regions where important military installations are sited and nowhere else?

Why did the crew of the plane fly it, breaking the air navigation rules, and not react in any way to all the attempts by Soviet Air Defense Forces, both ground and airborne, to make contact with it? There are also analogous questions which we have the right to put to the Japanese side which remain unanswered. Why did the Japanese aviation authorities not raise the alarm when the plane, if it were an ordinary one [bud on obychnym], did not appear at the alloted time and in the prescribed place, in the zone of their responsibility? Why did neither the American nor the Japanese authorities make contact with the Soviet side for some kind of explanations of the situation which had come about in order to prevent a tragedy?

These and many other questions -- and we have asked them -- must be answered not only to us but to the whole world by those who are now trying to assert that this was allegedly a normal trip by a normal commercial plane. But these questions remain unanswered. Here is [words indistinct] [Moscow Domestic Television Service in Russian at 1900 GMT on 9 September as part of "The World Today" program carries a report on this press conference that here reads: [Unidentified speaker] There is another question, asked by (Vishnevskiy), a correspondent of the LIBRE BELGIQUE newspaper: Who, when, and along what channels was the Soviet side first contacted in connection with the incident involving the South Korean aircraft Georgiy Markovich, would you be so kind as to reply?

[[Korniyenko] From the first moment when this aircraft left Anchorage and, shortly afterwards, went not along an international route, but in the direction of the Soviet Union, subsequently intruding into its airspace, right up until ... (filling indistinct passage)] airspace and right up until the moment of its disappearance no one, neither the Americans nor the Japanese, nor anyone else approached us through any channels at all. Ten more hours went by and it was only after that, at about the same time, that the U.S. deputy secretary of state in Washington and the U.S. charge d'affaires ad interim in Moscow approached us, inquiring if we knew anything about the fate of the aircraft. Moreover, Under Secretary of State Burt told us -- and I wish to emphasize this particularly -- that according to the data of the U.S. tracking stations, this aircraft got lost somewhere in the region of Sakhalin. Burt's references to the data of American tracking stations in this first statement, in the first approach to us completely refute the positions taken by U.S. officials later, the position of denying that U.S. services specially followed its flight over the territory of the Soviet Union and their claims that the picture of what had happened, as they draw it, was allegedly subsequently reconstructed on the basis of data from other sources. In his first approach to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the American charge d'affaires in Moscow also mentioned the fact that radio communications had been maintained with the aircraft right up until the last moment. However, having correctly stated the approximate time and place of the aircraft's disappearance he stated at the same time that radio communications had been broken off when the aircraft was situated at the point of 147 degrees and 23 minutes Eastern longitude and 42 degrees 23 minutes Western longitude [as heard] and this is about here, that is to say 600 km away from the point where the aircraft really did disappear. As we can see, the American side right from the very beginning and right up until this moment has failed to mke its contentions meet the facts in any way. They do not meet for the simple reason that it does not want to tell the truth and does not want to admit to the evil committed.

[Rogers in English] [Words indistinct] Take a spontaneous question from the floor?

[Zamyatin in English] Yes, of course.

[Rogers] May I please ask one question of General Ogarkov. Thank you for taking a spontaneous question from the floor. My name is Walter Rogers, I'm with the American Broadcasting Company.

My question to the General is -- and I will speak slowly, so it can be translated -- Why, after tracking that airplane for 2 and 1/2 hours, were your pilots unable to identify it as a 747 jumbo jet, and second, assuming everything that the Soviet Government says is correct, why did the Soviet Union then shoot down a passenger plane with 269 men, women and children aboard?

[Ogarkov] I suppose that you are familiar with the Soviet Government's statement. The reason why we were busy with this aircraft for 2 hours is set forth clearly in it. At the same time, this confirms once again that the Soviet side undertook all possible efforts in order to make the aircraft land at an airfield, at one of the Soviet airfields, and to sort the matter out. But it stubbornly ignored all warnings from Soviet aircraft and did not want to enter into any communication. That is, I should like to draw your attention to the fact that it behaved exactly the same way as did the crew of that same South Korean airline when it violated the airspace of the Soviet Union in 1978 in the region of Karelia. The signature was one and the same. The Soviet side did everything possible in order to make it land at an airfield; it wanted none of this. Moreover, it was maneuvering, it was evading and escaping from the Soviet fighters; it was avoiding the Soviet antiaircraft missile forces zone. What kind of aircraft was it? After all possibilities had been exhausted, the order was given and the Soviet airmen did their duty.

[Zamyatin] Next question! Japanese correspondent of the newspaper CHUNICHI, (Shunkatsuna), to Marshal Ogarkov: What can you say about the statement that the intruder aircraft was shot down outside the airspace of the USSR?

[Ogarkov] That is not correct. At 0620 local time 120 tracer shells from a cannon were fired at the aircraft [po samoletu]. The intruder aircraft could not have failed to see these shells because there is a report by the pilot who was following our aircraft closely, the supporting pilot. He was some 10 km away and he plainly saw the traces from these shells, fired along the course of the intruder aircraft. The intruder did not react. And at 0624 the command was given to stop [presekat] the flight over the territory of the Soviet Union in the area of Pravda population center on the southwest coast of Sakhalin Island, which was carried out without delay, over the territory of the Soviet Union. After that the intruder aircraft continued in descending flight for some time, and then radar observation of it was lost. Such is the true picture.

[Zamyatin] A second question from correspondent of the Japanese television company NTV, (Terasima Yudai). He asks: Comrade Marshal, if the USSR air defense services had been able to force the aircraft to land on one of the airfields and confirm that it was a civilian aircraft, then probably the disaster would not have happened. What is your opinion of this?

[Ogarkov] Indisputably, all the efforts of the Soviet air defense forces were directed toward this. You and I would not be sitting today in this hall if the intruder aircraft had carried out the commands of the interceptors.

[Zamyatin] Question from Swedish television: The Korean airliner was over Soviet territory for 2 and 1/2 hours. What contacts were then received between the local command post and Moscow? At what level was the decision taken to halt the flight?

[Ogarkov] The Soviet air defenses acted precisely in keeping with the law on the state border of the USSR. The decision to stop the flight was taken by the command of the air defense region.

[Zamyatin] A rider to that question: Marshal Ogarkov, who gave the order to halt the flight? When did you hear about the incident? THE WASHINGTON POST, Michael Tott.

[Ogarkov] The order to the pilot to stop the flight was given by the command of the air defense region.

[Zamyatin] The second question was: When did you hear about it?

[Ogarkov] Well, the whereabouts of the General Staff is known to everyone. There is probably no general staff in the world which in such a situation would not receive reports of such an incident.

[Zamyatin] Question from a political observer of IZVESTIYA: What in your appraisal is the role of the American RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft, whose presence on the course of the intruder aircraft was confirmed by U.S. officials, and what special assignment could have been involved in the present case?

[Ogarkov] Well, here I have in this connection the statement of an official representative of the Pentagon who said that the RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft was in the area of the violation of the airspace by the South Korean aircraft for the purpose of checking the potential of the Soviet antiaircraft system.

Of course, we suppose that this was far from the only aim of the American plane being here, because both planes, as we can even see from this diagram of the flights established by our radiotechnical equipment, were precisely coordinated, and their flights were carried out in such a way as to complicate the situation for our air defense system, besides this to confuse, in short to complicate and confuse this situation. And in addition to this, the RC-135 plane was apparently both monitoring the Boeing 747 flight during the initial period, and at the same time was recording the actions of the Soviet Air Defense Forces in connection with this.

[Zamyatin] A question from Soviet television please.

[Unidentified speaker] Is there a possibility of the Soviet air traffic control system maintaining or making contact with the American and the Japanese ones?

[Second unidentified speaker] Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko:

[Korniyenko] There are constantly functioning direct radio-telephone channels existing between Sapporo and Khabarovsk: there are communications on a fixed shortwave frequency between Tokyo and Khabarovsk, and finally there is the telegraph air-navigation link between Tokyo and Khabarovsk and between Tokyo and Moscow. So that communications channels, as it is said, are more than sufficient, but the Japanese services did not contact us on any one of them to make any kind of report or inquiry of any kind about the flight of this aircraft, although it is not now being denied that they were maintaining regular communications with it and were observing it on their own radar system and consequently knew and saw that it was located where it should not have been according to the route of the aircraft. The question arises: Why even then, when this aircraft suddenly disappeared from the screens of Japanese radar systems in the area of Sakhalin -- and they saw this -- why were these channels not employed? I think there can be only one answer to this question, and I am convinced that that answer is obvious to every one of those present here.

[Zamyatin] There is a question from the British agency REUTER: Of what nature were the actions of the Soviet interceptor in order to halt [presecheniye] the flight of the liner? Was a missile used?

[Ogarkov] Yes. Two air-launched missiles [aviatsionnyye rakety] were used.

[Zamyatin] A second question from the same agency. Where was the decision to halt the flight made?

[Ogarkov] Over Soviet territory in the region of the Pravda settlement at the southwest extremity of Sakhalin Island.

[Zamyatin] Third question: Have debris or bodies been found?

[Ogarkov] Regrettably, nobody has been found alive, nor have any bodies of victims yet been found. True, we do not know exactly the area where the aircraft came down. But some pieces of debris have been found, and some articles from the aircraft. In the area where these articles and debris were found search work is now under way by Soviet and also by American, Japanese and South Korean facilities [sredstva]. Regrettably, I repeat to you, nobody has been found alive, nor have bodies of any victims been discovered up to the present time.

[Zamyatin] A correspondent of THE LOS ANGELES TIMES asks you: Why did the Soviet Government wait 6 days before admitting the fact that it cut short the flight?

[Ogarkov] Well, I suggest that it is simply necessary to better read what was reported by our Soviet press: Specifically, the TASS reports and statements that have been issued before now.

[Zamyatin] FRG second television, (Joerg Sager): Could you give more detail on the number of air defense fighters brought in and on their actions?

[Ogarkov] I can. Four fighter aircraft were dispatched over the territory of Kamchatka. Six fighter aircraft, Su-15s and MiG-23s, were dispatched over the territory of Sakhalin to intercept.

[Unidentified speaker] Question from the hall, please.

[(Loory) speaking in English with simultaneous Russian translation] (Stuart Loory), Cable News Network: Marshal Ogarkov, I was interested in your comment that the decision to terminate the flight was made by a district commander. Am I to take it that that means that there was no consultation with anybody in Moscow, and by extension does that mean that the Soviet Union is willing to risk war with the United States on the decision of a district commander? Er, the second part of that question: Can you please tell me when the Politburo, and particularly General Secretary Andropov, was first notified of this incident?

[Ogarkov] In the Soviet Union there exists a strict order for determining responsibility for actions in such situations. How the decision was taken and by whom I have already set out. The decision to destroy was taken by the regional air defense command. In my opinion it is wholly inappropriate to extend an analogy from this to war between the Soviet Union and the United States.

[Zamyatin] CTK's (Izhakov), chief of the Moscow department. Are searches being carried out in the area where the aircraft came down? Does the Soviet side intend to hand over belongings and other articles picked up to the proper quarter? I can state that searches are being carried out. They are being carried out by the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States. Belongings and articles found will be handed over by the Soviet side in accordance with the established procedure. There is a question from a correspondent of the U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, (Nicholas Danilov). In the period between January and September this year, U.S. fighters flew out 77 times to identify Soviet reconnaissance aircraft, and escorted them from the air identification zone both on the eastern and the western coast of America: Not once did the United States fire upon a reconnaissance aircraft. Nor did they fire on the Aeroflot passenger aircraft that was flying over a prohibited zone of New England without permission in November 1981. How is it possible to justify the fact in the case in question a passenger aircraft was brought down? Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko, if you please:

American fighters went out 77 times to identify Soviet aircraft in the air identification zone. Now, what is the air identification zone? This bears no relations to the concept of a state's airspace. The Americans themselves define what they term the air identification zone as they like, they can fly into it as much as they like. But I repeat that this does not mean at all that on these 77 occasions our aircraft were present in the airspace of the United States. I must say directly that between January and September of this year the government has made no such protests to us, precisely because there have been no such intrusions into U.S. airspace. Therefore it is impossible to compare these things.

Second, referring to the case of an Aeroflot aircraft in November 1951 [date as heard], I shall give you an explanation on this question with pleasure. Indeed a claim was made against a Soviet civilian aircraft -- the only case of this kind in 50 years of diplomatic relations between us, incidentally. But what was the essence of this claim? You may judge for yourselves: In November 1981 the State Department said that an Aeroflot aircraft, a scheduled aircraft which at the time was flying regularly on the route between Moscow and Washington, during one of its flights there and back, passed, it was said, over a sensitive area in New England. [word indistinct] flights were banned for the duration of 1 week. However, on checking, it turned out that in this case too the Aeroflot aircraft had strictly observed the flight schedules approved by the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States. Aeroflot presented evidence proving this, and the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board was prepared to revoke its previous decision. However the U.S. State Department sent this board a letter which said -- and you may take this on trust, or else go and check, ask for the text of this letter -- It said in black and white that, regardless of whether Aeroflot's evidence was correct or incorrect, it must be punished. That is what the logic is like.

I would add that in this seemingly trifling case, the approach of the present administration to relations with other states is reflected in general, as in a drop of water. As they say, I'll do as I see fit, and whether it is right or not doesn't concern me. That is the answer to this question.

[Unidentified speaker] Your question please.

[second unidentified speaker] [words indistinct] From what has been said here and from the explanations of the Soviet press, it is becoming clear that it was not possible to establish that a civil aircraft was concerned. In that case two conclusions could be drawn, that it was either a spy aircraft or a military one. And so my question is: Why was it not shot down immediately, and why did they expose themselves to the risk that the aircraft might drop a bomb or launch a missile, or transmit important information; why did they wait for 2 and 1/2 hours?

[Unidentified speaker] Please, Vasilyevich.

[Ogarkov] Because the Soviet Air Defense Forces undertook every effort in order to make the aircraft land. But it did not react. What could be done? Secondly, you see, this aircraft was going toward very important bases of the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. It was over the territory of the Soviet Union for more than 2 hours. How might you react to such actions?

[Second unidentified speaker] Further to this, I would add, with your permission, that if the Soviet Union really had some antihumane aims, then it would have been possible to destroy the aircraft at an earlier stage of its entry into the Soviet Union's airspace, and the Soviet Union has all the capabilities for this. But that is the point, that the Soviet Air Defense Forces tried during the time that you are talking about, 2 hours, to use everything that the Air Defense Forces have in order to try, first, to show the aircraft that it was in a zone of violation of the Soviet Union's airspace.

Measures were taken, both by aircraft drawing close and by aircraft dipping their wings -- about which Marshal Ogarkov has spoken here -- and by light signals. As for the aircraft, at any rate the Air Defense Forces did all they could to make it leave a zone which is a zone of violation of USSR airspace. It left the region of Kamchatka, which is closed, and then again entered USSR airspace, for the second time, in the zone situated around the Island of Sakhalin, and Sakhalin itself. Here, too, efforts were made. The aircraft was under observation all the time by the USSR air defenses. Here too efforts were made by the Air Defense Forces -- all measures were taken to make the aircraft land on a Soviet airfield, just as was done in the airspace over Kamchatka, but the aircraft did not obey. It did not obey -- I stress this point, so to speak, to you -- any orders from the Soviet fighters, and the Soviet forces guarding USSR airspace had no alternative. For 2 hours we struggled, in essence, to make the aircraft land safely on the territory of the USSR, and to ensure that the lives you are talking about now were, as it were, preserved.

But we did not know then that this was a civilian aircraft. We knew it was a military aircraft, and here Marshal Ogarkov has adduced all the evidence that the Air Forces guarding Soviet airspace have no doubt that it was engaged in special intelligence tasks. This explains why it was not intercepted at an earlier stage. In this all humanity was shown by the Soviet forces defending Soviet territory.

[Unidentified speaker] Permit me to read a question to you, Nikolay Vasilyevich, from Comrade Kozlov, NOVOSTI political observer: Why is it that up to now the USSR has not given the precise coordinates of the spot where the aircraft fell, and, in the view of the West, is taking a negative attitude toward permitting the United States and Japan carry out search-and-rescue work in its territorial waters and airspace?

[Ogarkov] We could not give a precise answer about the spot where it fell because we ourselves do not know the spot, in the first place. And as for the assertions in the Western press that the USSR is hindering searches by U.S. Japanese or any other forces, that does not correspond to reality at all. The Soviet Government has already informed both Japan's government and the U.S. Administration that it does not intend to occasion any hindrance to the search for this missing aircraft. Moreover, the Soviet Government has reported that fragments of an aircraft, which may be taken for the aircraft that fell into this sea, have been found in a certain area. And this government has given the coordinates of these areas where we have found fragments, where our ships and aircraft are also conducting a search. Another matter is that the Soviet Government will for the time being consider that there is no need to enter the territorial waters of the Soviet Union, because the fragments have been found a considerable distance from the borders of the Soviet Union's territorial waters, and on the strength of this, evidently the search should be made where these signs exist.

But I repeat once again, there is no hindrance, there are no bans at all. At present, tens of ships are searching, I stress, tens of ships, in the region, I would even say, many tens of ships, from the United States, from Japan, from South Korea and from the Soviet Union. They are working together, in the same areas.

[Unidentified speaker] A question from the hall, please. Just a moment, please.

[(Temko) speaking in English] (Ned Temko) of THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR newspaper: I'd like to ask two questions of Marshal Ogarkov, if possible, First, you said that the order to shoot down the aircraft was given on the regional level, by the regional air defense command. Does this imply that the leadership in Moscow, whether military or political, that is, yourself, Defense Minister Ustinov, or other Politburo members, were informed of the plane only after it had been shot down? And second question: transcripts...

[Unidentified speaker in English, interrupting] No, the first one, then the second. OK?

[(Temko) in English] OK, I'm sorry.

[Unidentified speaker in Russian] THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR: You have said that the decision to shoot down the aircraft was taken by the regional command. Does this mean that the leadership in Moscow, in particular, Defense Minister Ustinov and Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, were informed about this only after the aircraft was shot down? That is the first question.

[Ogarkov] I have already said that a strict system exists in the Soviet Union for measures of responsibility for adoption of decisions in such situations and in other situations. In this case, the decision was made, as we have already stated repeatedly, and I repeat once again, by the command of the air defense region. The higher command was naturally informed at the proper time.

[Unidentified speaker] Your second question please?

[(Temko) in English] The second question is that both the Japanese and Americans have released what they say are the transcripts of conversations between Soviet pilots, and at one point these transcripts refer to the Soviet pilots having noted the flashing of lights on what is called the target plane several minutes before its flight was terminated. Could you comment on this, please?

[Unidentified interpreter] The governments of the United States and Japan have published the transcripts of the conversations held by Soviet pilots with ground stations, and in one place these transcripts refer to the fact that several minutes before the plane was brought down [sbit], that is, the flight was stopped, Soviet pilots discovered uh, noticed flashing lights on this plane. Could you comment on this?

[Ogarkov] I can comment on it. The second plane which was following behind the first Soviet plane saw these lights on the first plane and reported about this to its command post.

[Zamyatin] A question from Swedish Radio, (Elizabeth Hedborg); Will the incident change in any way the approach of the Soviet Government to the talks in Geneva about medium-range missiles? Georgiy Markovich, be so kind.

[Korniyenko] The Soviet Union's approach to the talks in Geneva both on medium-range weapons has been, is and remains constructive and no such incidents can influence our approach, the approach of the Soviet Union.

But I will make use of this question to mention that in the West there are already reports being glimpsed that the American side, so they say, was preparing for the round beginning, in a constructive way, that it wanted to propose something or other which would enable progress to be made and now -- oh dear, oh dear -- because of this incident the American side is not being given the chance to show its constructiveness. I am mentioning this for the reason that in this there could be, if not the whole then a very significant part of the solution as to why it was at all necessary to organize this great provocation.

[Zamyatin] A question from the Italian paper REPUBBLICA; Marshal, do the General Staff and the Supreme Command of the USSR Armed Forces share the willingness, expressed by Comrade Andropov, general secretary of the Central Committee, who stated that in the event of a mutually acceptable agreement being reached, including a renunciation by the United States of the deployment of new missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union would, when reducing its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country to the level equal to that of the missiles possessed by Britain and France, liquidate all the missiles thus reduced including a significant number of the most modern missiles, known in the West as SS-20? Go ahead.

[Ogarkov] My answer is that they share it fully and unreservedly.

[Zamyatin] The second question...

[Korniyenko] The shortest reply! [laughter]

[Zamyatin] A question from PAP, (Knitselev Wladislaw): Have there previously been violations of USSR airspace by foreign military and civilian aircraft in the Far East?

[Ogarkov] There have been, on many occasions. This year alone 12 violations of airspace have been registered in the Far East, including those by aircraft from the U.S. aircraft carriers "Midway" and "Enterprise" in the region of the Kuril series [gryada], with penetration into the airspace of the Soviet Union of up to 30 km. There have also been violations by civilian aircraft, particularly in the region of the Bering Straits.

[Unidentified speaker] We can take a question from the floor here.

[Second unidentified speaker in accented Russian] You have said that the basis of your report was the results of the commission which was set up. I would like to know what materials were available to the commission for it to draw its conclusions, and might the press later acquaint itself with this material? Radio Caracol, Colombia [words indistinct]

[Unidentified speaker] Please repeat the end of your question, the end, the second part of your question.

[Same unidentified speaker in accented Russian] And would it later be possible for the press to acquaint itself with the material and the evidence which were available to the commission during its investigation?

[Unidentified speaker] Whether it would be possible for the press to acquant itself with the results.

[Ogarkov] It was possible for the commission to have fully at its disposal all materials which were relevant to this incident. All talk with command posts, with interceptor aircraft and with all other levels of command is documented, recorded. The commission looked through and checked all these documents. It travelled around and flew through all areas that could be of relevance to this event, in the maritime region, on Sakhalin, on Kamchatka and on the Kuril Islands. I had direct contacts, spoke, held conversations with all directly involved in this incident. And after this large amount of work it produced its conclusions, details from which I used today in my report. As for publication, I must say that, you see, the American side has for some reason so far published only the radio intercepts of the Soviet side of the Soviet airmen, but they have not published the radio intercepts of exchanges conducted on their own side. And as for the military angle, it is not, as it were, the done thing here in the Soviet Union to fully [break in transmission]

[Off camera speaker] Why is it that the Soviet Union did not itself approach the Americans or the Japanese for explanations in connection with the flight of this aircraft?

[Off camera speaker] You know this should have been done in the first place by the one who instituted the violation by the flight of the aircraft. [Words indistinct] if it was not a deliberate violation, if it was a normal aircraft on a trip.

[Off camera speaker] Yes. But all the data points to this certainly not having been an aircraft which had lost its way, as they are trying to portray it in the West. This has been established perfectly unambiguously, that this flight was being carefully monitored, it was carefully controlled. This flight, it was deliberate, of this there can be no doubt whatsoever. And the American, the Japanese service, as has already been reported, the service for air traffic control, has direct communication with the zonal air traffic control centre of the Soviet Union in the area of Khabarovsk. No doubt one could have expected questions in this connection from it, primarily. We were engaged from the beginning in explaining these circumstances, and took steps in order to make this violating aircraft land and sort out what was happening here at the place in question.

[Unidentified speaker] Your second question.

[Unidentified journalist in English] Can I put my second question very quickly? Can I inject a moral note into what is otherwise clearly seen as a military or security matter by asking whether it would have made a difference if there were over 2,000 people on the plane and not over 200, or would their deaths also be justified in defense of the borders of the Soviet Union?

[Interpreter] May I now bring up the moral side of what has so far been seen as a military-political question, and ask: If there had not been 200 but 2,000 people on board this aircraft would this have made any difference or would what happened also be justified by those considerations which you give?

[Ogarkov] Why should 2,000 be sent to engage in reconnaissance activities? Whether it's 269 or 2,000 why should people be put in reconnaissance aircraft? I image that this is a hypothetical question. It has nothing to do with the present specific incident. Why, in general, draw the comparison? Two hundred or 2,000 people? Why were people used in this filthy provocation? This is precisely how the question stands. And the fact that this was a provocation is completely beyond argument, completely beyond argument.

[Zamyatin] May I add one little piece of information to this? Looking through the morning material today I saw a report from a Japanese newspaper which says — it is the TOKYO SHIMBUN -- and it quotes the statement by Tommy Toles, press secretary to the American congressman, McDonald, who was flying in this aircraft. Toles asserts that on 1 September, that is to say, when the flight had already taken place, he was told the following day at the U.S. Defense Department -- and I quote the Japanese newspaper which quotes Toles -- We fear most of all that this aircraft might have been shot down by a Soviet aircraft. The U.S. secretary of state avoided comment on this question. But what can one say to comment on this? So here is the reply to your question. Just a minute. Now I have a question from the KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY, from (Vokhaba al-Hashana). He asks: What could you say in connection with the fact that President Reagan demands that the Soviet Union apologize for what happened to the South Korean aircraft and pay compensation for the damage that has been caused? And a second question: Why did the Soviet Union not publish earlier the reports about the repeated violations of Soviet borders by American military aircraft? Georgiy Markovich, please be so kind:

[Korniyenko] I am sure that you all know that the Soviet Government has expressed regret in connection with the deaths of people guilty of no crime who were on board this aircraft. It has stated that it shares the grief and the pain of their relatives and those close to them. And this really is so, insofar as we regret that they became the victims of the American special services. But it is those who sent them to their deaths who should apologize and bear the responsibility -- and not just in terms of cash. And so to ask why -- and I have in mind the fact that it is not the correspondent who asks this but it is what the President is putting to us, that we should apologize -- well, as they say, he ought to turn around and look into a mirror, and then it would be clear to whom these pieces of advice need to be addressed. Why did not the Soviet Union publish earlier reports about the repeated violations of Soviet borders by American military aircraft? It is not simply reports. We have made a whole number -- this year we have made some, we made some last year -- of repeated, official representatiions to the American Government. Several of them have been published in the press, some of them have not been published. But representations of this kind have been made, including, and I repeat this, some which have been published in our press.

[Unidentified speaker] Just a minute, I will let you, you will all have questions. Be quiet. [last sentence rendered in English]

[Second unidentified speakers] But not everyone.

[Zamyatin] A question from the LOS ANGELES TIMES correspondent. In its statement of 6 September the Soviet Government said that Soviet pilots in interceptor aircraft could not know that this was a civilian aircraft. Could you then explain whether this means that the flight of the aircraft was stopped by mistake? If the Soviet pilots had known of the civilian nature of the aircraft, would its flight still have been cut short in the same way the flight was indeed cut short? And there is here a second question which is similar to this one, Nikolay Vasiliyevich, permit me to read it out. It is from (John Burns) of THE NEW YORK TIMES. What type of interceptor aircraft carried out the order to cut short the flight?

[Ogarkov] The cutting short of the flight of the violating aircraft was not done by mistake. All antiaircraft defense means that for 2 hours were taken to make it land at airfields -- and taking into consideration the circumstances I reported, beginning with the very commencement of the flight -- there was total confidence in all command points of the antiaircraft defense system that here we were dealing with a reconnaissance aircraft. The aircraft which stopped the flight of the violating aircraft was a Soviet Su-15 interceptor.

[Unidentified speaker] Yuriy Kornilov, Yuriy Kornilov, TASS.

[Kornilov] President Reagan states that the Soviet Union supposedly declares in an arbitrary way what the borders of its airspace are. What can be said in this connection?

[Zamyatin] May I reply to this one? I will answer your question. We have already repeated more than once that the air borders of the Soviet Union are established by the law on the state borders of the Soviet Union, and they are established strictly in accordance with the norms of international law. As far as Reagan's assertions are concerned -- his speech about this aircraft being in airspace that the Soviet Union declares to be its own -- well, as we have already pointed out in the statement by the Soviet Government, the statement cannot be regarded as being a manifestation of frank disregard for the sovereignty of any state, including the Soviet Union [as heard]. Let me remind you that some two decades ago some people in the leading circles in the United States tried to send secretly a U-2 aircraft to the Soviet Union, implementing their so-called Open Skies plan, and it was, as you know, engaged in espionage.

It is well known what embarrassment [konfuz] all that affair ended in. For the sake of fairness, I shall add that the then U.S. President found the courage and in the final analysis admitted the fact, and took responsibility for the failure of the U-2 spy mission. I should like to say that maybe people will be found in the current administration as well who have enough courage to admit that they sent this spy aircraft into totally secret areas of strategic importance to the Soviet Union with quite definite aims. After all, this will all be cleared up in the United States sooner or later, the sooner the better. And then it will be clear who is really responsible for everything that has been done.

Let this lady speak, she very much wants to. Go on please.

[Taylor speaking in English] I'd like to ask a question -- Pamela Taylor, American Broadcasting Company. What hard evidence do you have that this was a reconnaissance plane? Not assumptions or deductions, hard evidence?

[Interpreter] Do you have any concrete evidence that this was a reconnaissance aircraft? Not any suppositions or statements, but concrete evidence?

[Ogarkov] All the analyses of the behavior of this aircraft, the route of its flight and the nature of its flight, and analysis of the interaction between this aircraft and other aircraft in the Kamchatka zone, plus the choice of directing the flight to avoid the zones of antiaircraft missile complexes, in the direction of very important Soviet defense installations, and finally behavior quite incomprehensible for a normal aircraft, such as completely ignoring all warnings from the side, or the country, whose airspace it had violated -- all this could not fail to convince us that we were dealing with a reconnaissance aircraft. And I state quite openly that at all command posts of the air defense system the opinion in that period was completely unambiguous: We were dealing with a reconnaissance aircraft. Nevertheless, right up to the last moment they tried to make it land, so as finally to sort the matter out. But when it failed to react to warning shots as well, 120 shells -- there was nothing more to do.

[Unidentified speaker] Questions from the hall, please.

[(Lehmann) speaking in German] (Lutz Lehmann), FRG radio and television. I have a question on the statement by Mr Zamyatin. [passage indistinct]

[Zamyatin] Yes, I am very sorry, but probably the translation from Russian to German was insufficiently accurate, so that you are asking questions that have already been given an exhaustive reply by all three of us here. But, if you like, I can arrange for an accurate translation into German to be given to you -- if you have no objections? [preceding question in German] Then I shall repeat the replies which were made. The first answer to your first question, about the fact that the report that the flight of the aircraft was stopped, was made in the first TASS report. It was only necessary to read it correctly. You may shake your head from left to right, but allow us the fact that we understand our language better than you understand the Russian language, so to speak. Particularly political language. That is the first question. When you wanted a more precise definition we clarified this entire matter in the statement by the Soviet Government, but that was the very same statement which had been made. Finally, since it is evidently difficult for your propaganda to reshape itself, so to speak, Marshal Ogarkov made a totally clear statement today that, yes, the aircraft was brought down [sbit] by the Soviets. He explained the reasons why it was brought down on our, Soviet, territory, which we defend, to which a reconnaissance plane was sent, conducting espionage work over the most strategic areas of the Soviet Union.

Ask any American military person, so to speak, what would happen, let us say, if an aircraft, even with the indentification marks of the Soviet Union, so to speak, appeared somewhere in the area of Los Alamos. What would happen to it? Would it be received with flowers, so to speak? No. They probably would not even try to make it land at the nearest airfield, as we tried to do for 2 hours.

As for the second question, who made the decision: Marshal Ogarkov, who heads the Soviet Union's General Staff, has told you quite clearly that the decision was made at the level of the regional air defense command. Is that not enough for you? What else do you want to know? It really was taken at that level, with subsequent reports to the departments as provded for in our military regulations. That is just how it was all done.

I think that answers have already been given for these questions, so to speak, and please, gentlemen, in order to save time, do not repeat your questions a second time. We are wasting both your time and ours. Here is a question from (Vasiliy Vasilev) of the paper OTECHESTVEN FRONT, People's Republic of Bulgaria. Does the Soviet Union intend to take part in the work of the International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] Council, which has been convened in connection with the incident which has occurred?

[Korniyenko] The USSR is a member of the ICAO Council, and its representatives constantly participate in the council's work. There is no reason, I think, for assuming that they will not participate in any of the council's future sessions.

It is totally natural that the position adopted by the Soviet representatives will in essence be based on the same statement issued by the Soviet Government. After all, they are representatives of the USSR.

[unidentified speaker] May I ask you another question? [word indistinct] from the paper UNSERE ZEIT, FRG, (Helmut Weinland). The Western mass media assert that the West's reaction was extremely moderate, and they advise the USSR to adopt the same methods as those the U.S. Administration is apparently offering the USSR and to admit its guilt. What is your view of such a statement?

[Korniyenko] Well, in the first place I would not agree with the correspondent as regards the fact that he deems the reaction to be extremely moderate. In the second place, to make use of recommendations and searches for some kinds of bridges, which have apparently been proposed to us for the admission of our guilt -- this I consider not even to be presenting the issue seriously. The only one who can admit guilt is the one who is guilty of something. We have nothing to admit some sort of guilt about. The blame and responsibility rest -- I repeat what has been said here many times -- on those who sent the people to their doom, first in order to carry out their reconnaissance aims, and second -- allowing for the possibility of the outcome which did in fact come into being -- who consciously set about it in order to make use of it for their political, far-reaching political aims, having in mind the justification of their militaristic course, for which international tension is needed, and for which it is necessary to arouse hostile feelings toward the USSR, to discredit the USSR and to discredit the Soviet people. This is where one should search for the guilty ones.

[Zamyatin] History, I am convinced, will brand them so. It is they who must be persuaded to admit their guilt. [passage indistinct] I shall give everyone a chance to speak, as far as time allows. Here is a question from THE NEW YORK TIMES by John (?Burnes). It is for you, Nikolay Vasilyevich. Is the Soviet Government ready to provide an international guarantee not to shoot down civilian aircraft which have strayed off course and which are in the USSR's airspace as a result of error? If not, does this mean that civilian aircraft run the risk of being shot down?

[Ogarkov] These are very important questions. I must say, and the Soviet Government statement stresses this, that tens of international routes pass through the territory of the Soviet Union. Many, many thousands of aircraft fly on these routes. Nothing has happened to them, nothing is happening to them, although to speak frankly, there have been isolated incidents even of mistakes in the flights of these aircraft. And this is a fact.

But here there is one difference of principle. You asked this question in reference to aircraft that have strayed off course. When we investigate the question of the incident of occurrence [intsident ili proisshestviye] of the South Korean aircraft, we are dealing with a quite different picture. Here one cannot speak of an aircraft which has strayed off course. This is not a matter of an error made by any side.

Here we are concerned with a preplanned special action, and I can officially ask the American side: Why have they not yet responded to a direct and clear question? Once again: Why did they not say -- why did they not correct the error of the aircraft, when it headed for Kamchatka instead of keeping to the international route? Why did the American-Japanese air traffic control not raise an alarm when the absence of this aircraft on the established route was detected, although there is a set time by which it should as an aircraft on a regular flight pass through certain points? Why did it enter Soviet airspace together with another aircraft, an RC-137? Was it in order to confuse [word indistinct] the Soviet air defense system, to mislead it? And at the same time we do not rule out the possibility that it may have been monitoring [kontroliroval] the flight of this aircraft which it had sent [zapustil] into Soviet airspace. Here there can be no question of it being a case of an aircraft which had made a mistake and strayed off course. It is quite obvious. It was not a lost aircraft, it was an aircraft specially sent.

And, I repeat for the fifth time, after we had been busy with this aircraft for 2 hours, trying to make it land at a Soviet airfield, and when all command points of the Air Defense had become convinced that they were dealing with a reconnaissance aircraft, flying with impunity and impudently over the Soviet Union's territory, impudently not responding to all the warning signals of our air defense system, what else could we do?

I think this question should be asked of those who organized the provocation. For that reason I repeat once again: We are talking about something quite different; it was not a lost aircraft, and so putting the issue in that way, about some guarantees or other, is not required. It is not required, no guarantees are needed. The Soviet Union fulfils honestly and fairly its international obligations and never deviates from them.

[Unidentified speaker] Please, a question from the hall.

[Unidentified speaker in Russian] Norwegian television. I shall ask a new question. Judging by your statement today, you had substantial problems in determining the nature of the aircraft. Had you known that there were 269 hostages sitting on board, would you have recommended the decision to stop the aircraft, all the same?

[Ogarkov] Had it been known that there were 269 people there, although in fact nobody knows how many there were, then the appraisals would probably have been in accordance. But in this case, all levels of command [kommandnyye instantsii] proceeded from the evaluation that they were facing a reconnaissance aircraft. And the thought could not enter the head of any of them to make an appraisal of how many people were on the aircraft. [passage indistinct]

[Unidentified speaker] Could the Soviet side offer proof, material, for instance, from radio interception or a video recording made by your radar in the sector you have indicated, showing beyond dispute the maneuvers of these two, the U.S. aircraft and the Korean airliner? For instance, it would be possible to offer this material to the ICAO forum.

[Zamyatin] Could we present some kind of proof that the aircraft was engaged in impermissible activities in the airspace, and could we offer this to the ICAO? [passage indistinct]

[Ogarkov] Well, sir, I don't quite understand the question, because what proof is required when the aircraft deviated 500 km from the established route, flying over the Soviet Union's territory for 2 hours? That has been admitted by everyone.

[Zamyatin] [First words overlap previous statement] [Words indistinct] President admits that the RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft was in flight.

[Ogarkov] And the second part of the answer. You say, what data are there? Look, everything that is shown on this diagram has been registered [zafiksirovano] and documented. It is documented by our radio-technical means. So if there is any need for this evidence, there it is. All the commands that were given have also been registered and documented, and the state commission that has been formed is checking all these recordings. We see no need to provide any proofs for what is completely obvious.

[Korniyenko] And what is shown in the square [kvadrat] has been admitted by U.S. officials, the proximity of this aircraft and the other reconnaissance aircraft, the RC-135.

[Novikov] A question from Soviet television. I have a question evidently for our Ogarkov: You have already replied in part to my question, but I should like to hear a more detailed explanation, since I consider it very important. Could the U.S. ground services, which were directing this flight, have observed that it was deviating from the established international air route? And if they could, could they have contacted it and corrected the flight, if they wanted to? That is my question.

[Ogarkov] Unarguably they could have. What is more, well, all the military specialists can confirm this completely accurately. But we rule out -- we completely rule out the fact that the ground services did not observe such a deviation from the route. This is impossible. Even these flights along an international route, when there are about 12,000 planes a year, according to the data we have at our disposal, there have been deviations from the route in individual cases, but they concern only 5-10, or maybe a little more kilometers. But not to observe such a deviation, I repeat again, that is impossible.

[Zamyatin] A question, please, from (Masuhira Katone) of Japanese Telvision, (Fuji). It was said here that the Soviet plane had fired warning shots and had tried to force the South Korean airliner to land. However, according to the talks between the airliner and the ground control center there are no grounds to consider that the airliner understood the warning. Is it true that the warning shots were fired? Do you mean, I am asking, according to the talks between the airliner and the ground control center? But where was that published, these talks? Do you know or not? Or are you asking us? I ask Mr (Masuhira Katone) to make his question more specific on the talks between the airliner and the ground services. Where did he get the words that according to the talks between the airliner and the ground control center there are no grounds to consider that the pilot of the airliner understood the warning? Please answer this question in order to make it more specific for a reply. Can Mr (Masuhira Katone) make his question more specific by answering my question? Does he have at his disposal a recording, I am making the question still more specific, of the talks between the airliner and the ground center, and where was this published? If you please. Can't Mr (Masuhira Katone) answer? Then I consider that he has no question.

[(Masuhira Katone) speaking in English] What I wanted to know, if warning shots were delivered, the plane, Korean Airlines, should have recognized it. So, it is very strange that there is no indication that Korean Airlines recognized the warning shots. So, just explain that such warning shots, which were not recognized by the plane, is [word indistinct] or not?

[Interpreter] I would like simply to say that if warning shots were made then it is highly unlikely that the pilot of the liner did not notice this. But, according to all the information available, one can draw the conclusion that there were no indications that the pilot of the liner....

[Off camera speaker interrupts] Let me answer this question; I shall answer briefly.

[Interpreter continues] that the pilot of the liner noticed these shots. Therefore I would like to clarify whether they were made. And as regards the reports of the communications [peregovory] they have been published in Japan.

[Zamyatin] Please.

[Ogarkov] The first intercepting aircraft gave four bursts of tracer shells from a cannon. In those 4 bursts 120 shells were spent. The fact that this aircraft, our first fighter, fixed such shots was clearly seen by the second pilot, who was flying behind that aircraft at a distance of several kilometers and who during that period, that moment, reported this to the command post, that he observed (?the four) bursts of tracer shells along the course of the flight of the intruder aircraft. Now, these recordings, incidentally, were, after all, intercepted by the Japanese service too and they can no doubt say better themselves. But why he did not react to these tracer shells, that is what we too would like to know.

[Korniyenko] And as regards the recordings, history knows quite a few cases of what is done with recordings.

[Zamyatin] I would like to ask a question on behalf of (An-Nu'am), correspondent of the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-WATAN. Is there any likelihood that the intruder aircraft, for over 2 and 1/2 hours, could have already transmitted important secret data to the United States? Please, Nikolay Vasilyevich.

[Ogarkov] I don't understand the question, to be honest. What do the 2 and 1/2 hours and the importance of secret data to the United States have to do with it?

[Zamyatin] Could it already over these 2 and 1/2 hours have transmitted secret data from the territory of the Soviet Union to the United States?

[Korniyenko] Certainly it could. And in the statement we speak of this.

[Ogarkov] What did it transmit? Probably only it knows. But the fact that it could have transmitted is beyond doubt. And the fact that communications were in short coded signals from the intruder aircraft, that has been recorded precisely. As to the contents of these short, recorded transmissions, we cannot say.

[Zamyatin] Nikolay Vasilyevich, here are five questions for you; they are roughly the same; they are from the U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, (Danilov); the Japanese KYODO news agency -- and the essence is as follows: that the South Korean Boeing 747 aircraft is much larger than the American RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. They have different outlines, they have different radar signatures. The RC-135 is shorter than the Boeing 747, and so forth. How could the Soviet pilots and the Soviet radar operators mistake a Boeing 747 for an RC-135?

[Ogarkov] No one, of course, is claiming that they are absolutely identical. But the fact that the outlines are similar is beyond doubt. Here, though, I would ask you to consider another point. It is all very well to sit in the hall here and compare the outline of one aircraft with another. But, after all, the flights took place during complete darkness in cloudy conditions. The distance between the aircraft was such that these differences between them are very difficult to establish. Proceeding from this, it was quite natural and possible to take one aircraft or its outlines for the outlines of another aircraft. But I would even like to say that the main thing here is also the fact that the whole range [kompleks] of analysis regarding this aircraft absolutely convinced us that there we were dealing with a reconnaissance aircraft [samolet-razvedchik], or in any case -- and I shall express this more precisely, a reconnoitering aircraft [samoletrazvedyvatelnyy], carrying out, fulfilling, a special task. It is quite possible that it had other tasks: This perhaps will be revealed sometime -- tasks no less unseemly than the original tasks.

[Zamyatin] Please ask us questions from the hall.

[Unidentified speaker in Spanish interrupted by Zamyatin] Just a minute, just a minute. We do not understand your language. Just a minute, let's see. Translator! See whether our communications are operating. They are? Go ahead.

[(Aguste) speaking in Spanish] (Teresa Aguste) of the Mexican paper UNO MAS UNO. Given that the Soviet Union brought down the aircraft without knowing that it was a Korean commercial aircraft, how did it come about that it was ascertained that indeed it was this aircraft? What material have you found? How many bodies have you found? And what will be the Soviet reaction to the boycott announced by some countries with respect to Aeroflot flights?

[Zamyatin] Perhaps we didn't know? I should like to say, in reply to your question, that you probably have not correctly understood what has been said here, and what was said in the Soviet Government statement. We knew quite definitely that the aircraft in Soviet airspace had intruded into the Soviet Union's airspace, that it had penetrated deeply into the Soviet Union's territory to an extent of 500 km. Five hundred kilometers! That amounts, one might say, to almost a third of the way into your country, taking it from your border with the United States. It intruded, and for 2 and 1/2 hours engaged in activities having nothing to do with the delivery of passengers from New York to Seoul. This was not its aim. If it had been, it would not have had to cross strategic regions of the Soviet Union, there to engage in a standing patrol [barrazhirovat], so today, and conduct reconnaissance activities in this region. How did it do this?

Let us allow this affair to rest, so to speak, on the conscience of those who sent this aircraft on its way, all the more so because the U.S. President announced with great eloquence and cynicism that no one will ever find out who fed the computer with the data which brought this aircraft to the territory of the Soviet Union. Well, this means that someone did feed them into the computer, and that someone did bring this aircraft to the territory of the Soviet Union. And he knew very well for what purpose he did it.

How did the Soviet authorities act -- replying to your question that we brought down the aircraft without knowing whether it was a civilian or a military plane. We did not have such doubts. We had a plane which was engaging in intelligence-gathering activities over the Soviet Union's territory, and this was clear to the Air Defense Forces. This was, likewise, clear to those who attempted to make that plane land on the territory of the Soviet Union and to clear everything up thoroughly on the ground: Are there people there or are there no people there; what was it doing and what, so to speak, was its task and aim -- all this we wished to have explained, but the pilot rejected this. He had to convey his precious cargo or to deliver it some place, irrespective of whether there were people there or not.

If the Americans knew that there were people there then the Soviet Union was not aware of this. Comrades, it was unaware of this.

And we saw that plane in our airspace and continue to view it to this very day as an intelligence-gathering plane. The RC-135 aircraft was on a parallel course with it. The U.S. President said of this aircraft that it was a reconnaissance aircraft. Does this mean that it was receiving something from that aircraft? What was it receiving? Guess, so to speak, for yourselves. Think: Why did they send an aircraft with reconnaissance purposes on a parallel course which accompanied it? At times it came quite close to that plane. We had no doubts that the plane was engaging in reconnaissance activities, and that is why it was brought down. Here you have a reply to your question.

About the sanctions: We have already, so to speak, grown accustomed to gigantic sticks being waved in Washington. But we are still alive, still alive. Look, they played their game with sanctions on gas, but we built the gas pipeline and will soon put it into operation. Now they are adopting other sanctions. Well, this is bad of course, international relations are being upset; Soviet-U.S. relations are being upset. Instead of improving them, they upset them in Washington, at any price. They announce one sanction after another. But we can survive without, so to speak, paying attention to what the White House wants, as it has grown accustomed to doing, to ordering now one nation, now another. We are not frightened of this.

I should like to let Genrikh Borovik ask a question; he has been asking to speak for a long time.

[Borovik] This is my question: As is known, the aircraft concerned belonged to a South Korean company. As is known, it was our Soviet territory which it infringed upon. But reaction to this incident was displayed first of all in the White House, which is quite a long way both from South Korea and from Sakhalin Island. And the propaganda hullabaloo over all this is being raised by Washington, the capital of a state whose territory, as is known, was infringed upon by no one. And the decisions about sanctions are also being adopted in Washington. And the calls to America's European allies to follow the U.S. example with regard to the Soviet Union also came from Washington.

I should like to ask how the strange geography of all this provocation can be explained.

[Zamyatin] Please, [name indistinct].

[Korniyenko] It would be possible to answer this question in quite a lot of detail. But in view of the fact that we do not have much time left, or more accurately, it was already run out, I shall answer very briefly. A fairly old but primitive method is being applied in this case: The guilty party makes the loudest fuss about what has happened in order to divert attention from himself. That is how I would briefly answer your question. All the more since your question already contained the answer, to a large extent, more expansively.

[Zamyatin] Esteemed gentlemen, we are finishing our work at 1700 exactly; so I will allow one question from the hall, and we have two questions here. Then we will finish. One question from the hall please.

[Unidentified speaker in English] Question from THE DAILY TELEGRAPH. If the Soviet Union bears no guilt in this affair, as you have said today, why have you not yet told your own people that 269 people died?

[Interpreter] If the Soviet Union states that it is not guilty of what has happened, why have you not yet told your people that 269 people died?

[Ogarkov] Why must we have known how many people were in that aircraft? In general we did not estimate, did not reckon that we were dealing with some scheduled aircraft, we were dealing with a reconnaissance aircraft. And why should we report that a certain number of people were on board it?

Surely this is known best of all by those who organize the provocation. The question should be addressed to them and not to us, and it would seem the number of people on board will be sorted out later. But the Soviet Union could not tell the Soviet people about that on the basis only of what was being said by those who organized the provocation. That would have been illogical, to say the least.

[Zamyatin] A question from THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nigel Wade. Do you consider that the protection of the sacred borders of the Soviet Union was worth the lives of 269 people in the Korean aircraft? Georgiy Markovich, please.

[Korniyenko] The protection of the sacred borders of our state and of our state as a whole, our system, cost us, ourselves -- you know very well -- how many millions of lives; but it was in defense of our system and our borders in that sense. We did not sacrifice to our holy, sacred, borders 269, or however many it was, other peoples' lives. They are sacrificed by others, not in order to defend their own sacred borders but for much baser aims. It is they who should be asked.

[Zamyatin] Here is a question for Marshal Ogarkov from Robert Cullen of NEWSWEEK. Why, after the Korean aircraft showed its lights, did the pilot still receive the order to stop the flight?

[Ogarkov] The Soviet aircraft did not see the lights of the Korean aircraft, and the Soviet pilot received the order after he reported that he had carried out warning shots, and that the violator aircraft, just as before, did not respond. After that he received the order to stop the flight.

[Zamyatin] Question from TASS correspondent Vashedchenko. In your opinion was the choice of the moment for sending the violator aircraft into the USSR's airspace coincidental? I shall allow myself to say in answer to that question that the moment for the anti-Soviet provocation was not chosen by chance but at the very moment when the world public was disposed to expect, rightly, radical solutions of those problems, those major problems, which are important for the whole of mankind, the solution of problems connected with stopping the arms race, with the solution of questions dealing with substantial reduction of nuclear missile weaponry in Europe and lowering the level of confrontation of the strategic nuclear missile forces. All of this requires trust and relaxation of tension. But the Reagan administration's plans pursue completely different aims. And the practical aims, the practical actions of the administration amount to whipping up even more the existing international situation. And in this acute international situation to strive for the production of new types of weapons, mass destruction weapons. The very weapons we propose to reduce, the Reagan administration wants to build up, in order to have superiority over the Soviet Union and to dictate to us not only sanctions, but also its own moods, wishes, its own policy in various areas of the world.

We have already said -- and our leaders have stressed it -- that we will not allow such superiority.

But for the American Administration to be able to conduct its policy, including that in Europe, so that their plans for deployment of Euro-strategic missiles may be implemented in December, tension is necessary, and it was lessening recently and it is being artificially whipped up by sending a plane into our airspace, on the assumption that this provocation will either achieve military goals for the United States -- military reconnaissance goals -- or it can use as part of the composite plan of this provocation military-political aims of unleashing propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union, hatred toward the Soviet Union, and in these conditions declare that agreement was complicated because, so to speak, the Soviet Union displayed, as they like to say in the United States, an inflexible policy; that here it is not the responsibility of the United States but of the Soviet Union to undermine confidence in our peaceful initiatives, to all that our country is doing to strengthen peace. Such are the goals pursued by those who organized this provocation and the choice of timing was not coincidental, both in terms of time and political situation. They want to make it red hot.

And the subsequent actions of the U.S. Administration -- all the propagandist campaign unleashed around this, and which continues to be unleashed -- confirm the fact that these plans were also pursued by the organizers of this provocation.

With that, esteemed gentlemen, allow me to conclude the two questions -- as I have already said, we have given answers to two questions -- and to thank you and conclude our press conference. Goodbye.

Comparison of Ogarkov Statement

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 10 September carries in its First Edition on page 4 a TASS report on statement given at a press conference by Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and deputy defense minister of the USSR, on 9 September. The PRAVDA report, entitled "Press Conference in Moscow," has been compared with the TASS English version published in the 9 September Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page DD 1, revealing the following variations:

The PRAVDA version begins: The USSR Defense Ministry and USSR Foreign Ministry held a press conference on 9 September in Moscow for Soviet and foreign journalists.

Taking part in the press conference were Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister; G.M. Korniyenko, USSR first deputy foreign minister; and L.M. Zamyatin, chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Information Section.

Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov made the following statement at the press conference

The nature of...(picking up second paragraph of TASS version and supplying opening passage)

Paragraph five, line two reads in PRAVDA: ...at the map. (Marshall of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov held up a large-scale map of the area where the aerial provocation occurred.)

The first stage...(supplying passage)

Paragraph seven, line three reads in PRAVDA: ...of the USA from Alaska to the Kamchatka beam and after that... (rewording)

Page DD 2, paragraph two, line four reads in PRAVDA: ...time on September 1. It was established by Soviet radar that for 2 hours it was on a somewhat strange standing patrol [barrazhirovaniye] there. At 0451 (Kamchatka time) another... (expanding passage)

Same paragraph, last line in PRAVDA reads: ...the USSR's airspace.

One wonders what kind of mistake it could have been in this case. It is perfectly obvious that the flight of this aircraft was being controlled. Precisely controlled, I would say. Therefore, the flight was deliberate.

The second stage... (supplying paragraph)

Paragraph four, lines one and two in PRAVDA read: ... intruder plane became provocative [vyzyvayushchiy]. As was announced... (replacing word "outrageous")

Same paragraph, lines two and three in PRAVDA read: ...responded to the warning signals of Soviet interceptor... (replacing "warning shots")

Paragraph five, line three in PRAVDA omits: ...a total of 120...

Page DD 3, paragraph two, last line in PRAVDA reads: ...their combat tasks.

Then N. V. Ogarkov, G. M. Korniyenko and L. M. Zamyatin answered correspondents' questions. (supplying PRAVDA concluding paragraph)

MOSCOW TELEVISION INTERVIEWS INTERCEPTOR PILOTS

LD101436 Moscow Domestic Television Service in Russian 1300 GMT 10 Sep 83

[From the Vremya newscast: video report from the Air Defense Units in Kamchatka and Sakhalin by Special Correspondent Aleksandr Tikhomirov and cameraman Yuriy Prokofyev; date and time not given -- live or recorded]

[Text] [Tikhomirov] Of course one may assert that the KAL Boeing 747 lost its way and found itself over our territory by accident, but you must agree that one cannot disbelieve the evidence of one's own eyes. Look at this: The altimeter needles show 11,400 meters. The Boeing was flying slightly lower, varying its altitudes at times. Can one really fail to distinguish where the ocean ends and dry land begins on the radar screen?

Those are the navigation lights of our fighter. In this way the signal is given: You are intruding. Follow me.

A computer has helped us recreate one point in the air situation that night. The bright spots on the radar screen are the intruder aircraft and two fighters going out to meet it.

We talked to one of the pilots who met the intruding aircraft over Kamchatka.

[Tikhomirov] Weren't there any glimmers of light on the fuselage of the aircraft? Perhaps some portholes showing a little light?

[Unidentified pilot] No, the aircraft was in total darkness. Even on the side of the dark area of the sky there were no signs of any illumination on the aircraft.

[Tikhomirov] All signals from our air defense over Kamchatka were left unanswered by the intruder aircraft. With lights fully extinguished it proceeded further, crossing the Sea of Okhotsk, and again appeared over the territory of the USSR. Following its course we arrived in Sakhalin.

On the night when we shot these frames the airmen on Sakhalin were again scrambled in connection with another attempt to violate our aerial frontiers. At times there are no fewer than ten such sorties a day. U.S. reconnaissance aircraft constantly play on the nerves of our air defense servicemen. This time too the reconnoitering American [amerikanets-razvedchik] applied a common provocative method: He flew a direct course towards our territory, appeared briefly [pomayachil] close to it, and rapidly moved away.

"When will they ever give up?" The commander of the duty flight said to us on his return.

In Sakhalin we spoke to pilots who were scrambled in the early hours of 1 September to stop a violation of the USSR's state frontiers:

[Second unidentified pilot] It is difficult to (?explain) what my emotions were at that moment. I had a certain task assigned to me and I was trying to fulfill it as well as I could -- a combat task, which is what gives meaning to the whole of my life.

[Tikhomirov] After the aircraft had passed over Kamchatka and attempts had been made to turn him away and stop him -- signals were made to him that he should land -- but he was going on, you presumably knew that this was an enemy aircraft?

[Second unidentified pilot] Yes, this is what I was thinking, and when he crossed our frontier I was only all the more sure of this -- that this was an enemy aircraft that had slipped into our territory and was flying over my home. It passed almost over our point. People were sleeping peacefully at this time, and he was flying on an espionage mission. The first thing I did, I went forward, up to this aircraft, and winked my onboard lights. Since I approached the aircraft to the distance I did -- and it naturally had a large crew -- they ought to have seen the winking of my onboard lights. We will find out about this, I thought. We can find out about this, (?even check up).

The second thing is that I fired four bursts of tracer shells right across his nose. At night they are visible many kilometers away. And this was right next to him. I dipped my wings, and then it is also visible that the onboard lights are rocking up and down. Under the international code this means: You are an intruder aircraft. He ought to have replied in some way to me to say: yes, I am an intruding aircraft, I am in trouble. Then, if he were in trouble, I would help him. If he were an intruder he could land at our airfield and then we would sort things out on the ground. But he continued to fly on the same course and at the same height. And I received the command -- a precise and definite command.

[Tikhomirov] And your actions?

[Third unidentified pilot] I was 12 km from the leading aircraft, and I was also sure that this was clearly an intruding aircraft, either flying on some specific espionage mission, or perhaps with a bomb on board which might by dropped on my house.

And all the maneuvers amde by the leading aircraft -- when he approached it, when he fired bursts of tracers ahead of the aircraft, which clearly had a large crew -- obviously after these maneuvers I formed the impression that this was either an espionage aircraft or an aircraft of another type -- even a bomber. I would not have hesitated. If (?they had called on me) the same thing would have happened. I would not have let that aircraft go.

TASS Report

LD101942 Moscow TASS in English 1920 GMT 10 Sep 83

[Text] Moscow September 10 TASS -- "The intruder plane was completely dark. There were no signs of lighting on it at all," said a Soviet pilot who on the night of August 31 and September 1 was the first to intercept the plane which intruded into the Soviet airspace over Kamchatka Peninsula. He reaffirmed during his interview with Soviet television that all signals sent to the intruder plane were unanswered.

Television reporters, who then visited an anti-aircraft defence unit on Sakhalin Island, talked with the pilots who had been sent to terminate the violation of the USSR's state border. They reaffirmed their conviction that they were dealing with a plane on a spy mission.

Said one of the pilots: "I flew towards the intruder (plane) and flashed the lights. It should have noticed them. But there was no response to the signal. After that, four salvoes of tracer shells were fired right in front of the plane, which were seen for many kilometres."

The pilot explained that the signals by the lights mean according to an international code "you are an intruder" and is to follow the Soviet aircraft to a Soviet airfield. But the intruder plane continued its flight.

"After I was ordered to terminate the flight," the Soviet pilot said, "I fulfilled the order."

On the night when the journalists interviewed the pilots, Sakhalin pilots were sent for a mission in connection with another attempt to violate the Soviet air border. "Sometimes there are as many as ten such sorties a day in this area," they were told. "American reconnaissance planes constantly get on air-defence men's nerves."

This time an American reconnaissance plane employed a usual provocative trick: It made a sharp turn towards Soviet territory, stayed for a while nearby and swiftly made off.

PVO AVIATION CHIEF MOSKVITELEV INTERVIEWED

OW110626 Moscow Domestic Television Service in Russian 2320 GMT 10 Sep 83

["Sentries of the Skies" Mikhail Leschchinskiy interview with Colonel General Nikolay Ivanovich moskvitelev, commander of aviation of USSR air defense forces: from the "I Serve the Soviet Union" program -- live or recorded]

[Text] [Leshchinskiy] It has already been reported in the known TASS and Soviet Government statements that early during the predawn hours of 1 September an aircraft intruded into the airspace of the Soviet Union after flagrantly violating the USSR state border. This occurred over the Kamchatka Peninsula. The aircraft then flew for 2 hours over the Sea of Okhotsk and Sakhalin Island.

Today we have invited Colonel General Nikolay Ivanovich Moskvitelev, commander of aviation of air defense (PVO) forces, to our studio. Nikolay Ivanovich, if you have no objection, my first question will be as follows: Please describe in greater detail the measures which were adopted immediately after the Soviet PVO detected the intruder aircraft.

[Moskvitelev] Of course. After detection of the intruder aircraft by our radar stations at one of the airfields on Kamchatka, fighters on duty were launched to identify the target and force it to land at one of our airfields. The fighters were directed to the area in which the intruder aircraft was located.

Using onboard radar equipment our pilots found the intruder aircraft and began closing in on it. With the help of special equipment for identification, installed on all aircraft including foreign aircraft, our pilots signaled the intruder aircraft with the aim of establishing whether the aircraft was friend or foe [svoy eto samolet ili chuzhoy]. The intruder aircraft did not respond to the IFF [identification, friend or foe] signal. Our pilots continued to close in on the intruder aircraft and attempted to communicate with the crew on the international search and rescue frequency of 121.5 megahertz.

It should be noted that a 24-hour watch is maintained on this frequency daily by all ground flight control points of aviation. This is a generally accepted international rule and this was undoubtedly known by the crew of the intruder aircraft. However, the crew did not transmit a May Day signal -- which means I am in distress -- on this frequency, a procedure also established by the international civil aviation organization (ICAO). Besides, while flying over the sea the crew should have also transmitted thus signal over the international frequency of 500 kilohertz for ships at sea.

The aircraft continued to ignore repeated subsequent signals and continued its flight drawing deeper into the Soviet Union's airspace, passing over important military installations. Therefore the intruder aircraft had no need for assistance and we drew the conclusion that everything on board was in working condition. Having a panoramic [panoramnyy] radar on board, the intruder aircraft could not have failed to see that it is being approached by other aircraft which could be fighter interceptors.

As the intruder aircraft approached Sakhalin Island, another group of Soviet PVO aircraft was launched to meet it and they again attempted to establish contact with it and lead it to the nearest Soviet airfield. However, the intruder did not react to either the signals or the warning maneuvers of the Soviet aircraft.

What kind of maneuvers were these? Our pilots, flying in direct proximity to the intruder, flashed their lighted on-board aeronavigational lights at him while simultaneously tipping their wings from side to side...

[Leschchinskiy, interrupting] This is also envisaged under international rules.

[Moskvitelev] True... in order to attract his attention, to attract his attention to themselves. However, neither the tipping of wings nor the flashing of lights elicited the necessary result. The intruder aircraft continued to refuse to fulfill the commands of the Soviet PVO fighter and continued its flight over Soviet territory.

Only then did the Soviet fighter fire warning shots with tracer shells parallel to the intruder aircraft's flight path. When the intruder aircraft still failed to obey demands to proceed to a Soviet airfield and attempted to escape in the direction of the Sea of Japan, the PVO fighter fulfilled the command post's order to stop the flight.

[Leshchinskiy] Nikolay Ivanovich, could you tell us what facts were used to analyze the intruder aircraft's actions, and how was it determined that the aircraft was on a military reconnaissance mission?

[Moskvitelev] In stopping the activities of the intruder aircraft, Soviet pilots had no way of knowing it was a civilian aircraft. The intruder was flying at night with its lights out and under poor visability. Besides, a U.S. Air Force RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft was on a reconnaissance flight at the same time and at the same height in direct proximity to the point where the South Korean aircraft entered USSR airspace.

At 2000 Moscow time on 31 August Soviet ground radar stations detected an unidentified aircraft with a radar signature identical to an RC-135 800 km northeast of Petropavovsk-Kamchatskiy flying on a course for Kamchatka and was also at a height of 8,000 to 9,000 meters.

The RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft and the Boeing 747 passenger aircraft are of the same type [odnotipnyy]. They have the same shape and geometric dimensions as well as the same flight speed. They can be distinguished in the air only during daylight, visually and at close range. For a pilot to do this at night is absolutely impossible.

An analysis of the intruder aircraft's activities shows that it did not accidentally deviate from its flight path. Aircraft of this type are equipped with duplicated precise navigation equipment of the Omega system which completely eliminates the possibility of deviations from a set course by such a considerable distance as more than 500 km.

The aircraft has five radio stations with various frequencies and communications channels. Finally, as I have already said, it has a panoramic radar which provides the pilot with a complete picture of the terrain over which he is flying; moreover it was radio contrasting [radiokontrastnaya] terrain. How could the crew fail to notice? Its route was supposed to be over the sea when all the while they were flying over land.

The crew was obliged to communicate with ground stations and in the case of a deviation from the set route, the corresponding U.S. or Japanese ground services would have directed it to set a flight path. Observing the deviation from the set route and the violation of USSR airspace for a lengthy period of time, U.S. and Japanese control points were obliged to inform the corresponding competent Soviet organs about the fact that this was a civilian aircraft with passengers on board. But this was not done, although there was more than enough time to do so.

All this led to the conclusion that an intruder aircraft on a special reconnaissance task was in Soviet airspace.

[Leshchinskiy] Nilolay Ivanovich, as is now known, this was not an isolated incident of violation of the USSR state border in this region.

[Moskvitelev] Yes, it should be noted that premediated violations of the USSR state border by U.S. aircraft, including Far East borders, are far from isolated incidents. This year alone, on 4 April, U.S. combat aircraft from the aircraft carriers Midway and Enterprise, which were 50-100 km south of Hokkaido Island, violated the USSR border nine times in the Kurile Islands area. In additon, violations occured on 6 July in the Bering Strait in the Ratmanova Island area. There were other violations.

All these facts show that the U.S. Air Force and Navy are doing this premeditatedlvwith the aim of exacerbating the already acute Soviet-U.S. relations which have come about through the fault of the U.S. Government.

[Leshchinsiky] Could you tell us what provisions determine the legal norms for the defense of USSR airspace?

[Moskvitelev] The 7th Session of the 10th USSR Supreme Soviet in 1982 adopted the Law of the USSR on the State Border of the USSR. According to Article 27, defense of the state border's airspace is invested in the country's PVO troops. While consistently pursuing a policy of peaceful solution of any problems on the border, the Soviet Union at the same time always gives due rebuff to those who dare to encroach on the inviolability of our borders. Precisely because of this, the law endows the country's PVO troops with all the necessary rights including the right to use arms and combat equipment.

I am citing Article 36 which talks about the use of arms and combat equipment for the defense of the USSR state borders: PVO troops, in carrying out the defense of the USSR's air frontiers, in cases where an end to a violation or the apprehension of violators cannot be achieved by other means, use arms and combat material. So the actions of the Soviet fighters on duty were lawful and legitimate.

[Leshchinskiy] Nikolay Ivanovich, what can you say about those who fulfilled their duty?

[Moskvitelev] Because of the daily concern of our party and government, the country's PVO troops have at their disposal everything necessary to fulfill the complicated and responsible tasks entrusted to them: modern combat means and, most important of all, our remarkable personnel, who are experienced, skilled, and boundlessly loyal to the motherland.

As always, Soviet pilots will reliably defend the air frontiers of our motherland -- the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

[Leshchinskiy] Thank you for the interview, Nikolay Ivanovich.

IZVESTIYA ON GROUND CONTROL ROLE IN KAL INCIDENT

PM111906 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Sep 83 Morning Edition p 5

[Special correspondent Boris Reznik report: "The Way It Was"]

[Text] Kamchatka-Sakhalin-Khabarovsk -- The truth about what happened in the early hours of 1 September on our eastern borders has been explained clearly and in detail in the Soviet Government statement, in TASS reports and in the materials of the press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists held in Moscow. Today we report on the indirect participants in those events.

...The radar scanners at the Air Defense Forces (PVO) subunit tracking station here on the desolate, rocky coast of Kamchatka seem to be filled out by the biting winds which blow constantly from the Pacific. Good weather is a rarity in these parts, with their storms, fog and thick cloud. Officer Oleg Pakhomov's team was on combat watch that night. The tense silence of the control center was broken by operator PVT Sergey Osipov's voice:

"Target spotted."

The tracks of an unidentified aircraft crept across the radar installation's flickering screen. Here in this remote place, hardly a day goes by without U.S. or Japanese reconnaissance aircraft being spotted flying along our borders.

The American aircraft carriers "Midway," "Coral Sea" and "Enterprise" cruise constantly along the coasts of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands. But this time something extraordinary happened: The aircraft crossed the USSR state border and flew on deep into our territory.

A fighter-interceptor took to the air. The experienced pilot, used to the vagaries of Kamchatka's weather, recalls that flying conditions were difficult: the sky was covered in layers of thick cloud, and a strong, violent wind was blowing. The officer rendezvoused with the violator precisely on the line of interception he had been given. He received the order to ascertain the aircraft's affiliation and to signal to it that it had intruded into someone else's airspace.

The interceptor flew a parallel course. By his cockpit light the airman saw the big, dark silhouette of an aircraft very similar in outline to the American RC-135 reconnaissance plane. Incidentally, the latter is very easily confused with the Boeing 707, which in turn is distinct from the Boeing 747 only in its smaller dimensions. Along with military specialists, we looked at photographs and drawings of these aircraft. The RC-135 has the same swept-back wings and the same configuration [konkiguratsiya] as the Boeing, and the engines are slung on pylons the same way... Moreover, their tactical-technical characteristics are almost identical.

The aircraft was flying at high altitude, with its navigation lights switched off. The officer took the measures provided for by the code of international regulations to make the violator land at one of our airfields. He flashed his side lights, rocked his wings, and flew ahead and then turned away -- which indicates the command "Follow me." The aviators who had encroached on our airspace failed to react to the signals given. Nor did they respond by radio on the international emergency frequency of 121.5 megacycles.

As they received information from the interceptor, our ground control centers became increasingly convinced that the unidentified aircraft was not off course. Only a spy aircraft carrying out a reconnaissance mission could behave that way.

On the approaches to Sakhalin Island the uninvited "guest," under constant observation by the radar stations, was intercepted by another group of PVO fighters. It also tried to make radio contact with the aircraft and to ascertain its affiliation. The response was silence. Our airmen once again made use of every possibility provided for by the international regulations to make the violator submit and to make it land at our airfield: They flashed their side lights, and they flew ahead to signal. Finally one of them fired four long bursts of tracer shells from his Su-15 aircraft's guns along the violator's direction of travel.

The violator undoubtedly saw these signals. He picked up, and then reduced speed, and he begun to maneuver by changing altitude and direction of flight. But he still did not submit to the interceptor's orders.

Our airmen showed tenacity and composure in carrying out their flight mission to intercept the airborne target. Several times they had occasion to approach the violator aircraft close in, to draw its attention to their presence. At night, in conditions of poor visibility, this was very risky.

The ground control center specialists showed good training and high skill in this complex situation. As soon as the violator enterd the radar stations' visibility zone, the flight control officer set up a permanent escort and conveyed precise, essential commands to the interceptors.

The violator's flight path was marked on PVO headquarters maps. It passed over highly important strategic objectives in Kamchatka and on Sakhalin, and this added to the conviction that the stranger was on a special reconnaissance mission. The switched-off navigation lights, the time, just before dawn, when thieves are abroad, the dense cloud cover and the high altitude were the traditional conditions for spy aircraft incursions into our airspace. This year alone American military aircraft, including carrier-borne aircraft, have violated the Soviet borders in the Far East 12 times. Right now, in neutral waters in direct proximity to our territory, helicopters from the American frigate "Badger" are making constant reconnaissance flights across the entrance to [no traverse] Vladivostok. And the crew of the Boeing was conducting itself in our skies in accordance with espionage instructions.

It is now being asserted in Washington that it had strayed off course. Could such a thing have happened? Here is the opinion of a specialist, V. Nacharov, chief of the Far East Civil Aviation Administration:

"When a civil liner is missing from an air traffic control radar zone even for a few minutes, that is an emergency. An intensive search is started for it, and crash and rescue facilities go into action. In the 2 hours and more that the Boeing 747 was flying over Soviet territory, the Japanese air traffic control services controlling the flight did not approach us once. And yet a direct, two-way, round-the-clock landline and radio link exists between the civil air traffic control center in Khabarovsk and the Japanese aviation services. To illustrate how effectively it operates in other instances, I will give you an example: In November 1979 a terrorist hijacked a Japan Air Lines airliner at Osaka airport. At the time it was not known in what direction the aircraft was heading, but within 7 minutes of the hijack all the Soviet Union's aviation services were aware of the occurrence. [end of Nacharov quote unclear]

U.S. President R. Reagan is calling the Soviet side's actions in cutting short the spy-aircraft's flight "an inhuman act." The 10 American military airmen from the P-3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft which caught fire as a result of engine trouble and crashed into the sea near the coast of Kamchatka at the end of October 1978 could tell their President whether we are humane. The pilots found themselves aboard two fragile rafts in a stormy sea. They spent 12 hours in the sea, transmitting distress signals. They were saved, at the risk of their own lives, by sailors from the Soviet freezer-trawler "Mys Senyavin."

I saw those American pilots in the hospital, where they were recovering from shock. Disconcerted, wearing hospital pajamas, they probably felt very uncomforatble, conscious of the malicious intent with which they had come to our borders. I remember U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Edward (Keylor) saying at the time:

"We owe Soviet people our lives. We will never forget their goodness and humanity."

Guarding their country's security and Soviet people's peaceful labor, the Far East soldiers carried out the order to cut short the spy aircraft's provocative flight. They confirmed once again that the homeland's borders are sacred and inviolable.

TASS: U.S. ADMITS LYING IN KAL AIRLINER AFFAIR

LD120713 Moscow TASS in English 0709 GMT 12 Sep 83

[Text] Washington September 12 TASS -- The vicious allegation by the Reagan administration that Soviet fighters did not take any measures to establish contact with a South Korean plane, which had intruded into Soviet airspace, and force it to land at an airfield on Sakhalin Island has been totally shattered.

Under the pressure of irrefutable evidence which had been provided at a press conference in Moscow, organised by the Defence Ministry and the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, and which had proved the U.S. Administration's version of the incident involving the intruder plane to be totally false, the State Department was forced officially to admit that the Soviet pilot had really fired, as it had been pointed out at the press conference in Moscow, warning shots, letting the crew of the intruder plane know that it had violated the USSR's airspace and must follow the instructions of the interceptor.

Thus, the press points out [as received], one of the main supports under the Reagan administration's thoroughly false version of the events of September 1, which has underlied a rabid anti-Soviet campaign, collapsed. The U.S. Administration testified itself that it had been lying from the very beginning.

TASS HOLDS U.S. RESPONSIBLE FOR KAL INCIDENT

LD101648 Moscow TASS in English 1641 GMT 10 Sep 83

["Washington Is Responsible" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow September 10 TASS -- Ten days have passed since the South Korean plane's intrusion into the Soviet Union's airspace in the region of Kamchatka and Sakhalin. Many a hypocritical speech have been made during this time in the American capital, including by the U.S. President. They were all of a hostile and instigatory character. The true facts were deliberately distorted in them or hushed up, the state of tension in Soviet-American relations and the atmosphere of psychosis in the United States itself were whipped up.

Frantic efforts are continued through the NATO Coordination Committee for propaganda to impose a similar line on other NATO member countries and Japan. In Tokyo, for example, the U.S. Embassy held two press conferences a day. American correspondents accredited in Japan, abandoning their main work, took part in "round-table conferences" of all sorts, assuming the unseemly role of spreaders of disinformation supplied by the U.S. Administration.

As to the crux of the matter, neither Ronald Reagan, nor anyone from his team have as yet responded to a single legitimate question. The main question is why, after all, the South Korean plane found itself in the Soviet airspace, in the region where the USSR's major base of strategic nuclear forces is situated. Well, Reagan did say that no one will ever know who had fed such a route to the aircraft's computer. But it was fed in Washington. And it was fed by those who had access to the plane, to its flight programme.

Both Washington and Seoul keep silent, whereas it is their direct duty to investigate the plane's deviation from the normal flight path up to 500 kilometres inside the Soviet Union. But that is precisely what they in Washington, Tokyo and Seoul do not want to do, and avoid in all ways answering questions raised by correspondents at press conferences.

They fail to answer the question which the Soviet Union has repeatedly raised before the United States: Why did the ground tracking stations, which in the first half of the New York--Seoul international route are controlled by U.S. air traffic control services and on the second half -- by those of Japan, failed to return the plane to the correct path, although they knew, without a doubt, that the plane had veered off the international route and went deep into the Soviet Union's airspace? Why did they fail to notify the Soviet authorities that it was, as they now maintain, a civilian plane, which had "strayed off its course." For if it really had strayed off its course, efforts should have been made to return it (to the correct course) and to take urgent measures to prevent complications.

As this did not happen, a conclusion might now be drawn that there was simply no wish to return it. The more official statements Washington makes the more obvious this becomes.

If this was a reconnaissance plane -- and the Soviet Union has not the slightest doubt that it was on a espionage mission, and Marshal N.V. Ogarkov proved that with facts at a press conference in Moscow -- why did it carry people on board? The plan evidently was that the plane, posing as a civilian airliner, would pass through the Soviet Union's air space over the strategic installations and complete is reconnaissance mission, or that if Soviet air defense forces terminate its flight, a rabid anti-Soviet campaign would be unleashed at once. Now it is clear that the second option was used. Its script proved to have been elaborated to the slightest details -- all and everything went into action in a very short time from Reagan down to the White House press secretary.

Washington fails to adduce real facts to confirm its stories. Moreover, it is now being concealed if the airliner reported its passage over check points situated along the international route. The transcripts of the radio traffic between the airliner and the ground services who were in charge of that flight have not been made public. Everything that the White House has made public is its own version of the conversation of Soviet pilots who pursued the South Korean plane. The worth of such tapes, which had been meddled with in the USA, is known. It is not for nothing that U.S. Congressman Wright confirmed that during the first listening of the tape he had heard something which was not in the tape circulated later.

Instead of really finding out objectively what has happened Washington is now trying to force its allies into joining in the so-called "sanctions" which prejudice the national interests of those countries.

Much is now being said in Washington that the Soviet Union, allegedly, does not guarantee the safety of civilian flights over its territory. This is a lie, and the American administration knows that it is a lie. The Soviet Government's statement stressed that tens of international air routes cross the territory of our country. Foreign planes fly them for many years and nothing happens to them if they observe set rules. This is the guarantee of flight safety.

In brief, the U.S. Administration is obliged to come out with exhaustive replies to the questions raised. Reservations of the type that no one will ever know why an "erroneous programme" was fed into the aircraft computer, will not help avoid giving an answer. Even the U.S. president's participation in the memorial service at Washington's cathedral for the Americans who became victims of the provocation is not a good substitute for this answer.

PRESIDENT REAGAN HIT FOR ANTI-SOVIET 'HYSTERIA'

Seeks More Military Allocations

LD111536 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 11 Sep 83

[Text] President Reagan has demanded that Congress increase allocations for the American radio stations broadcasting to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. These centers, with their round-the-clock subversive broadcasts to the socialist countries, are viewed in Washington as a major weapon of psychological warfare. Speaking on radio, the President again used the South Korean airliner spy flight to Soviet airspace, to fuel anti-Soviet hysteria. Apart from propaganda efforts, the administration is trying to use the air provocation against the Soviet Union to press for more allocations for military purposes. According to the chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, John Tower, the incident can help Reagan get congressional approval of such military programs as the development of a new MX strategic missile.

Anti-Soviet 'Psychosis'

LD111144 Moscow TASS in English 1123 GMT 11 Sep 83

[Text] Washington September 11 TASS -- The U.S. Congress, the supreme legislative body of the country, reconvenes in the U.S. capital on Monday after a break of more than two months for traditional summer holidays. It will take place against the background of an unprecedentedly dramatic flare-up of anti-Soviet and militarist pyschosis whipped up by the Reagan administration.

Local observers point out that the extremely packed agenda of the Congress includes major questions of U.S. domestic and foreign policies. Next week hearings will be held on the Reagan administration's draft military budget for fiscal 1984 totalling an astronomical sum of 280 billion dollars. Before recession both houses of the Congress drafted a compromise budget giving the administration "the green light" to go ahead with the production of the new strategic missile MX, a new variety of chemical weapons, binary gases, and virtually all the other types of weaponry asked by the administration. According to the press, the Reagan administration, exploiting the incident with the South Korean plane it itself provoked, is now going to step up pressure on the Congress to make it rubberstamp its requests in the military field.

Decides on Additional Sanctions

LD091702 Moscow Domestic Television Service in Russian 1445 GMT 9 Sep 83

[From "The World Today" program presented by political observer Boris Kalyagin]

[Text] The Washington administration is continuing with its hysterical anti-Soviet campaign, using as its pretext the incident with the South Korean aircraft. Official U.S. representatives have been issuing gross slanderous attacks on our country and repeating malicious fabrications, refusing to listen to anything which overturns their trumped-up anti-Soviet version of events. No secret is being made in Washington of their aims, which are to use the provocation prepared by the CIA in order to present Soviet policy in a distorted light and to heighten tension in the world. In this U.S. President Ronald Reagan is setting the tone. The White House chief has taken a decision on additional sanctions against the USSR. These mainly concern the activities of Aeroflot in the United States. By the President's decision, from 15 September Aeroflot's offices in Washington and New York are to be closed and a ban is imposed on American airlines having commercial and other contacts with Aeroflot.

Reagan is trying to foist the sanctions policy on other NATO countries. Under pressure from Washington this question was discussed at a conference of NATO member countries' foreign ministers in Madrid, where they gathered to take part in the concluding phase of the Madrid meeting. The West European countries displayed reluctance to go along wholly with the White House and to sink the policy of detente. As has become known, no decision regarding sanctions against the USSR was taken at the conference. AFP reports that French External Relations Minister Cheysson stated that his country will not advocate unilateral sanctions against the Soviet Union. The same position was adopted by several other states.

The United States is trying to involve even the United Nations in its anti-Soviet campaign. On its initiative, in the names of Britain, Canada, Japan, South Korea, and a number of other countries, a draft resolution has been tabled in the Security Council proposing that some kind of enquiry be held into the incident of the South Korean aircraft.

Washington and the American mass media have probably broken all records in hypocrisy in expiating about their philanthropy, while in practice doing everything to justify their own aggressive course. But, of course, far from everyone in the United States thinks the way Reagan and company would like. A resolute rebuke of the anti-Soviet hysteria unleashed by the White House has been delivered by U.S. Communist Party Secretary General Gus Hall. He stressed that the U.S. and South Korea had organized an espionage provocation against the Soviet Union. The USSR, Gus Hall pointed out, had full right to cut short the flight of the intruding aircraft and to guard the security and sovereignty of its borders. The tragedy which has occurred is the result of the Reagan administration's and the Pentagon's provocative and adventurist policies, Gus Hall.

Condemnation of the anti-Soviet campaign has been delivered by French Communist Party Secretary General Georges Marchais. He said that those for whom the Soviet Union is nothing other than the empire of evil are trying to promote a caricature version of what happened. We have no illusions whatsoever as regards the real aims pursued by Reagan and the forces he represents, Marchais stressed.

Proclaims Day of Mourning

LD101349 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 10 Sep 83

[Text] President Reagan has staged yet another performance of pretended grief for those who died during the incident with the South Korean plane and sympathy for their relatives and friends. He was present at a specially-arranged funeral service at the National Cathedral in the City of Washington. Reagan also signed a proclamation proclaiming Sunday, 11 September, a day of mourning for the perished. In the proclamation he again slandered the Soviet Union, while keeping quiet about the fact that the responsibility for the death of the passengers and crew members of the South Korean plane is borne by U.S. special services, which organized the provocation in the Soviet Far East.

U.S. DRAWING ALLIES INTO 'ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN'

PM091519 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Sep 83 Morning Edition p 5

[Vikentiy Mateveyev "Political Observer's Opinion": "Using Other People's Hands"]

[Text] U.S. NATO allies, Japan, Australia, and other countries that Washington regards as members of the "Free World" are now being openly pressured by the Reagan administration. They are being told to join in Washington's malignant anti-Soviet campaign without delay -- even to take measures and steps dictated by the inflammatory course of confrontation with our country.

Speeches by U.S. ruling figures demonstrate their desire to secure now from the other Western countries what Washington failed to get the last time it demanded that its partners join the United States in curtailing commerical, cultural, and other ties with the Soviet Union.

Banking up the fire of a conflict situation in order to grill a favorite political beefsteak.... These tactics are not exactly original.

The question is how the governments which are being pressured are going to react. Let us not jump to conclusions, especially as the Western countries cannot be said to have adopted a common stance in this connection previously. Even the most pro-American circles in Western Europe and Japan were forced to acknowledge the substantial interests of business circles and dissociate themselves from the most reckless and adventurist aspects of Reagan's policy, although there have been occasions when, on certain matters, Washington has got its own way.

Nevertheless, I would like to point out one natural law, if you can call it that, which has emerged during the postwar period. It is that apart from directly damaging the allies' own fundamental interests, the act of following in the wake of Washington's anti-Svoiet course has meant that the policymakers in the United States have acquired additional means of influencing their allies in other spheres which has infringed -- often appreciably -- on these countries' interests.

The current efforts by Reagan and his entourage to throw together a fighting force comprising the countries of Western Europe, Japan, Canada, and Australia beneath the black banner of anti-Sovietism are an extension of the line whose devastating consequences are making themselves felt in the piling up of tension in Central America, the deterioration of the situation in the Near East, the kindling of the hotbed of conflict in Chad, the incitement of the South African racists to embark on military adventures against neighboring countries, and the support for the forces of external counterrevolution against democratic transformations in Afghanistan.

In each case the idea is to make other countries and governments do the dirty work for the United States.

As is known, the unceremonious way the United States pressured the French Government into interfering in the Chad conflict even angered those people in Paris who had similar plans anyway.

(V. Mesa), director of the political problems research center in the capital of Honduras, recently said: "Reagan's policy will turn our country into a bridgehead for war."

And although just recently they have been spouting off about the "principles of morality and humanity," the U.S. President and his ministers would actually like to bring about a world situation where mankind finds himself in the utmost danger. It is as if Washington officials were waiting for what happened to the South Korean aircraft in order to open the floodgates of the turbid campaign of enmity and hatred of our country. Those responsible for fueling the hysteria are talking about their hopes that now they will be able to push new military programs through more quickly, in particular the deployment of the new U.S. nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

Can any government aware of what is at stake in the balance between war and peace ignore such pronouncements?

"As for Europe, one envisages the possibility of waging a land war there..." Who said these monstrous words? Some irresponsible gutter press scribbler? No, they were uttered in an interview with a correspondent from the Tokyo paper YOMIURI by U.S. Under Secretary of State W. Schneider, who was in Japan at the time. And the interview was published in the 1 September issue, the very day when the public in many countries was demonstrating in defense of peace, for, as is known, it was on 1 September 1939 that World War II broke out.

In the same interview he talked about the intensified buildup of U.S. Armed Forces in the Far East and Pacific. The reference is to 10 Trident submarines with a new type of missile. In 2 years time the new B-1 strategic bomber is to come into operation and, before 1990, the "invisible bomber." At the same time, the United States is keeping up its pressure on Japan, insisting on a sharp increase in military expenditures and new commitments in the area or supporting militarist activity in that extensive region. A Pentagon report published in July points out that the Japanese Armed Forces are "lagging behind and are insufficient for the protection of sea routes."

Who, then, is encroaching on peace and tranquillity in that region? The South Korean aircraft incident, like many recent official admissions by Washington to extensive U.S. reconnaissance opeations against our country, shows who is playing with fire. The U.S. imperialist circles' expansionism certainly knows no bounds. And Washington wants to pursue this provocative policy, which is threatening the foundations of world peace, by bringing its allies to the fore, by using other people's hands. The Western capitals ought to stop and think hard about this.

'AIR PIRACY' IN NICARAGUA, LEBANON SCORED

LD111236 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 10 Sep 83

[Commentary by Aleksandr Zholkver, political observer of central television and All-Union Radio]

[Text] The fresh air raid, this time on the Nicaraguan port of Corinto, is the third in the past week. Every time the signature of the air bandits is one and the same: Aircraft without markings intrude into Nicaragua's airspace from neighboring Central American states. They bomb civilian targets: Managua International Airport, residential quarters of the Nicaraguan capital, the streets along the shore in Corinto. Everywhere completely innocent people die and the ruins of destroyed and burned-out buildings are left.

Everywhere there is the same incontrovertible evidence: The aircraft and the bombs they drop are of U.S. manufacture. The pilot of an aircraft shot down over Managua is a citizen of the United States. The airfields that the air pirates take off from are in countries where the U.S. military and special services are especially active. For instance, big military maneuvers in which U.S. troops are taking part are in progress in Honduras. These were recently inspected, as it happens, by the Pentagon chief.

Tomas Borge, Nicaragua's minister of internal affairs, has also noted that the U.S. Government is also using civilian aircraft for military and espionage activities against his country. They intrude into Nicaragua's airspace and photograph zones where Somozist gangs sent by that same CIA are later active.

But is it really only against Nicaragua that the Pentagon and the CIA are acting in this way? Is the United States not really now waging an undeclared war in Lebanon as well? After all, during these same days U.S. aircraft have made reconnaissance flights over Lebanese towns as well, which have then been shelled by U.S. ships. People have died there as well: Civilian residents have died.

I hear that President Reagan attended a memorial service in the Washington cathedral for those who perished during the incident of the South Korean aircraft that was sent into Soviet airspace by those same U.S. special services. Can one imagine greater cynicism and hypocrisy? Perhaps President Reagan will also order prayers for the Nicaraguans and Lebanese who have died as a result of U.S. bombs and shells.

U.S. DESIRED AS 'RELIABLE TRADING PARTNER'

PM091501 Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian No 36, 2 Sep 83 p 13

[Feliks Goryunov article under the rubric "Observer's View": "Switch Off, Switch On?..."]

[Text] The U.S. Department of Commerce recently announced that President R. Reagan has authorized the Caterpillar Tractor Company to deliver a consignment of pipelayers to the Soviet Union for the construction of gas pipelines. THE NEW YORK TIMES hastened to emphasize that "this action represents a real change of policy on the administration's part," for pipelayers have become a "touchstone" in trade with the USSR.

The Western press points out that R. Reagan's decision has been dictated not least by the approaching presidential election: The head of the White House wants once again to demonstrate his "flexible approach" to relations with the USSR, particularly since another failure of the policy of bans on trade with the East is in evidence. As a result of these bans "the Russians have lost nothing, while American companies and American workers have lost out," declared a spokesman for Caterpillar Tractors, which has had to dismiss approximately 20,000 people in recent years because of declining orders.

If the question of deliveries of pipelayers to the USSR is considered a touchstone, it is worth recalling its history. President Carter imposed restrictions on exports of petroleum and gas equipment back in 1978. The pretext was the farfetched thesis favored in Washington at that time of the violation of human rights in the USSR. The real reason was the desire to prevent the implementation of Soviet plans to open up new oil and gas deposits. The CIA asserted in its report at the time that "an oil crisis is mounting" in the USSR and the United States could take advantage of that to secure political concessions. (A couple of years later the CIA admitted that its assessment of the USSR's energy potential had proved to be mistaken.)

Then Caterpillar Tractors asked the new masters of the White House for an export license for pipelayers. After a long delay it received it, but then President Reagan imposed sanctions in December 1981, this time on the pretext of the events in Poland, but for the same purpose as his predecessor.

As is known, the Urengoy-Uzhgorod gas pipeline has already been laid this year, without American pipelayers and despite all the obstacles which the White House placed in the way of the West European firms which supplied compressor equipment. The President's latest decision concerning pipelayers signifies, as THE NEW YORK TIMES writes, "tactic acknowledgement of the fact that the attempt to keep Europeans from supporting the construction of the gas pipeline was a serious mistake."

Mistakes, particularly serious ones, must, of course, be rectified, the sooner the better. But can the present relaxation of export controls -- in relation to one American firm and one type of equipment -- be considered "a real change of policy" by Washington in East-West trade? Alas, there are no grounds for this yet.

The same report by the U.S. Department of Commerce states that measures to control exports in their foreign policy aspects still apply to equipment for oil and natural gas prospecting and extraction. And not only to this: At U.S. insistence the regulations governing trade in so-called "strategic commodities" are being tightened up within the framework of COCOM -- the NATO coordinating committee for exports to socialist countries. Neither has Washington in any way abandoned its discrimination against them in granting credit for foreign trade deals. And what "real change of policy" can there be, when not even business ties have been normalized? Soviet merchant ships are not permitted to put into ports, nor are Aeroflot aircraft allowed to land at American airports. Washington has frozen practically all scientific and technical contacts.

And, most importantly, the United States has not renounced the artificial linkage of trade with the changeable domestic and foreign policy situation, that is a practice which in May 1979 in BUSINESS WEEK magazine G. Shultz, then president of the Bechtel Corporation, called "switch diplomacy." At that time the now U.S. secretary of state wrote: "...We cannot leave decisions to the discretion of constantly changing persons who have access to this switch." What is needed in a matter of such importance to American business as international trade, G. Shultz pointed out, is not the improvisations of the administration but firm rules.

Over the years of such improvisations these truths have become still more topical for the United States. "We do not trade with the Soviet Union because we want to help it," another member of the Reagan administration -- Agriculture Secretary J. Block -- remarked a year ago, "but because we want to help ourselves." Well, that is a perfectly understandable wish. For our part, we can say: The Soviet Union is prepared to support the U.S. desire to "help itself" if it will be a reliable trading partner. And for this Washington must renounce "switch diplomacy," once and for all.

KAPITSA IN BEIJING FOR SINO-SOVIET TALKS

To Exchange Views

LD092119 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 9 Sep 83

[Text] Soviet-Sino talks have begun in Beijing. The delegations are headed by deputy foreign ministers of the two countries, Mikhail Kapitsa and Qian Qichen. Mikhail Kapitsa arrived in Beijing at the invitation of the Chinese Foreign Ministry to exchange views on issues of mutual interest.

XINHUA on Kapitsa Arrival

OW080726 Beijing XINHUA in English 0719 GMT 8 Sep 83

[Excerpt] Beijing, September 8 (XINHUA) -- Soviet Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Stepanovich Kapitsa arrived here by air at 11:00 hours this morning on a week-long working visit to China as a guest of his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen. Kapitsa is the first high-ranking official of the Soviet Government to come to China on an official visit in over 20 years. He was greeted at the airport by Qian Qichen, Ma Xusheng, director of the Soviet Union and East European Affairs Department of the Foreign Ministry, and Yang Shouzheng, Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union.

In an interview with XINHUA, Kapitsa said he would discuss international issues with his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen and other officials. Asked whether the discussions would involve Sino-Soviet relations, he said the discussions will touch on this issue but it is mainly up to Vice Ministers Qian Qichen and L. Ilichev to talk it over during the third round of Sino-Soviet consultations.

B.N. Vereschagin, first deputy director of the Far East Affairs Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, arrived here by the same plane in his company. During his stay in Beijing, Kapitsa will hold two rounds of talks with Qian Qichen. He will also meet with State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian.

Staying at Beijing Hotel, the Soviet guests will visit a people's commune in Beijing's suburbs. They will go to Tianjin to see a factory and the Xingang Harbor there.

PRC PARTICIPATES IN USSR INTERNATIONAL BOOK FAIR

LD112132 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 10 Sep 83

[Text] Over 90 countries are represented at the International Book Fair taking place here in Moscow. Several countries are taking part in this traditional event for the first time and one of them is China. The director general of that country's publishing center, Zhao Jianfei, has told our reporter: We very much want to cooperate with the USSR and the other socialist countries. Soviet friends have given us much organizational help and a warm welcome at this fair. We look forward to a further strengthening of our business and professional contacts.

U.S., JAPAN SET JOINT AIR EXERCISES NEAR KYUSHU

LD101641 Moscow TASS in English 0550 GMT 10 Sep 83

[Text] Tokyo September 10 TASS -- The Japanese and U.S. Air Force are stepping up preparations for holding joint operations with the utilisation of the most up-to-date electronic systems. The press reports today the the regular exercises to train such operations are to be held next week in the area of the Kyushu Island. Taking part in them will be a unit of Japanese "F-4" fighters, as well as the U.S. "B-52" strategic bombe from the U.S. Air Force base in Guam Island. This will be the 21st such exercises since August 1982.

U.S.-JAPAN AIR EXERCISES HELD OVER OKINAWA

LD120633 Moscow TASS in English 0627 GMT 12 Sep 83

[Text] Tokyo September 12 TASS -- Air forces of Japan and the United States held today joint exercises in the sky of Okinawa, the fifth such exercises since last April. 12 "F-104" and "A-4 Skyhawk" planes were engaged in training dog fights. Local observers point out that the exercises of the armed forces of the two countries became more frequent of late.

JAPAN GROUP PROTESTS SECURITY TREATY WITH U.S.

LD120623 Moscow TASS in English 0618 GMT 12 Sep 83

[Text] Tokyo September 12 TASS -- The Central Committee for Abrogating the Japanese-U.S. "Security Treaty" and Meeting the People's Demands ended its national conference here yesterday after discussing the tasks of struggle against stepped-up military preparations by the Japanese Government and against the consolidation of the Tokyo-Washington militarist alliance. The conferees endorsed a program of action to mobilise broad strata of the Japanese public to prevent increases in military spending and in the scale of joint exercises involving U.S. and Japanese armed forces. The conference also decided to organise in many Japanese cities mass demonstrations to protest against the forthcoming call of the U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft-carrier "Carl Vinson" at the port of Sasebo and hold nation-wide actions to urge the abrogation of the Japanese-U.S. "security treaty".

JAPANESE TRADE UNIONISTS ATTEND USSR MEETING

Session Opens in Odessa

AU031413 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 1445 GMT 1 Sep 83

[Summary] The 14th Soviet-Japanese Trade Union Meeting for Peace and Friendship Between the Peoples of the USSR and Japan opened in Odessa on 1 September. The consolidation of peace and the participation of the working people of the two neighboring countries in settling the most topical problems of the present day -- disarmament and eliminating the threat of a thermonuclear war -- are at the center of the attention of the meeting participants. Subbotin, chief of the Soviet delegation and AUCCTU secretary, reported at a plenary session on the role and place of trade unions in a socialist society. A report on the struggle waged by the workers class of Japan at the present stage and trade union activity was delivered by Komoto, chief of the People's Movements Department in the Sohyo Trade Union. The participants in the Soviet-Japanese dialogue attended an anti-war meeting held by the working people of the hero city.

Advocates 'Friendly Ties'

LD092136 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2004 GMT 9 Sep 83

[Text] From 26 August to 9 September, the 14th Soviet-Japanese trade union meeting for peace and friendship between the peoples of Japan and the Soviet Union took place in Khabarovsk, Moscow, Odessa and Leningrad. Those taking part adopted a declaration stressing that thetrade unions of the USSR and Japan advocate the development and reinforcing of friendly ties and of economic and cultural cooperation between the two countries.

MOSCOW OBSERVES BULGARIAN NATIONAL HOLIDAY

State, Party Greetings

PM091031 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Sep 83 First Edition p 1

[Text] To Comrade Todor Zhivkov, general secretary of the BCP Central Committee and chairman of the Bulgarian State Council

Comrade Grisha Filipov, chairman of the Bulgarian Council of ministers

Dear comrades!

On the occasion of the national holiday -- the 39th anniversary of the socialist revolution in Bulgaria -- the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the entire Soviet people send you, the BCP Central Committee, the State Council and Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, communists and all Bulgarian working people fraternal greetings and cordial congratulations.

The memorable day of 9 September 1944 marked a historic turning point in the destiny of the Bulgarian people. The fundamental political and socioeconomic transformations implemented in the country and the strengthening of the new social system were a reliable basis for the dynamic development of a modern multisector economy, science, and culture. The all-round material and spiritual progress made by Bulgaria over the years of people's power in close cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries is the natural result of the selfless labor of the Bulgarian working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia and the real fruit of the policy of the combat vanguard -- the BCP.

Soviet people are sincerely pleased with the Bulgarian people's impressive achievements. Truly fraternal relations are developing intensively and fruitfully between the CPSU and the BCP and between our countries and peoples -- relations founded on common ideals and aims, on the unshakable principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism. The Soviet Union will continue to do everything to improve the effectiveness of our all-round cooperation year by year, deepen the time-tested Soviet-Bulgarian friendship, and strengthen the combat alliance of our parties and states, which reliably serves the cause of socialist and communist building.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, being a strong link of the socialist community, actively participates in the activity of the Warsaw Pact Organization and CEMA and consistently pursues a peace-loving foreign policy. In the present complex international situation, when tension is continuing to grow in the world through the fault of imperialism, the significance of strengthening the unity and cohesion of the fraternal socialist countries -- which are fully resolved to augment their common efforts aimed at halting the arms race, diverting the nuclear threat from mankind, and strengthening peace and security on our planet -- is greater than ever.

Celebrating together with you Bulgaria's glorious festival -- freedom day -- we wish the fraternal Bulgarian people happiness, prosperity, and great new successes in building a developed socialist society and in implementing the tasks outlined by the 12th BCP Congress.

May the unbreakable Soviet-Bulgarian friendship live through the ages!

CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, USSR Council of Ministers

Ustinov Greets Dzurov

FM091518 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Sep 83 First Edition p 1

[Text] To the minister of national defense of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Army General Comrade D. Dzurov.

Dear comrade Minister,

On behalf of the USSR Armed Forces and on my own behalf I heartily congratulate you and the servicemen of the Bulgarian People's Army on the national holiday -- the 39th anniversary of the socialist revolution in Bulgaria.

During the years of the people's power the Bulgarian working people have achieved impressive successes in all sectors of sociopolitical life, in boosting the economy, and in developing science and culture. Soviet servicemen warmly acknowledge these achievements.

We note with deep satisfaction that the relations of fraternal friendship and all-round cooperation existing between our peoples and Armies are continuing to develop and strengthen.

On this festive day we wish you and all Bulgarian servicemen further successes in improving Bulgaria's defense capability and in ensuring its successful progress along the path of building developed socialism.

With communist greetings

D. Ustinov

Marshal of the Soviet Union

USSR defense minister

Bulgarian Envoy's Reception

LD111525 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1950 GMT 9 Sep 83

[Text] On 9 September Zhulev, the ambassador of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the USSR, arranged a reception to mark Bulgaria's national holiday -- the 39th anniversary of the socialist revolution in Bulgaria. The reception was attended by Khalilov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; Talyzin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; heads of a number of ministries and departments, military commanders, and representatives of party, administrative and public organizations.

On the same day, diplomatic officers of the Embassy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in the USSR laid a wreath at the Lenin Mausoleum. They also laid wreaths at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin wall and at the monument to Dimitrov, the glorious son of the Bulgarian people.

REPORTS ON GROMYKO'S VISIT TO FRENCH CAPITAL

Talks With French Leaders

LD092031 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Sep 83 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "A.A. Gromyko's Visit to France]

[Text] Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR Andrey Gromyko has arrived on a working visit at the invitation of the French Government here today.

At the airport Andrey Gromyko was met by the Minister for External Relations of France Claude Cheysson. Among the welcoming party was the USSR Ambassador to France Yu.M. Vorontsov.

On the same day Andrey Gromyko met with the President of France Francois Mitterrand.

During the conversation held, they examined some of the cardinal problems of world politics as well as the questions of principle of the further development of relations between the USSR and France.

Andrey Gromyko drew attention to the concrete proposals of the Soviet Union, aimed at curbing the arms race, easing the international tension and preserving peace. Special stress was laid on the need to prevent the nuclear arms race in Europe. A major step demonstrating the USSR's goodwill were the new Soviet initiatives aimed at achieving mutually acceptable agreements at the Geneva talks on nuclear arms limitations in Europe, which the president of France had been informed of by a special message from Yuriy Andropov.

On the Soviet side it was stressed that the possibility for a mutually acceptable agreement is still there if the other side, -- the United States, is willing. The conviction was expressed in this connection that France's weight and influence in Europe and the world make it possible for it to operate actively in favor of reducing the threat of nuclear confrontation in Europe.

The opinion was expressed about the importance of joint efforts by the USSR and France, despite the differences in their political systems, for strengthening universal peace, getting the international relations back to the mainstream of detente, settling peacefully the sources of tensions and conflicts in different parts of the world.

The results of the Madrid meeting of representatives of the participating countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe show that such a course of international affairs is possible also in the present aggravated situation. As it was confirmed during the conversation, the Soviet Union and France, coming out for the consistent continuation of the European process, attach special significance to the convocation of a conference on confidence-building measures, security and disarmament in Europe.

The need to develop mutually advantageous cooperation, and to above all maintain political dialogue between the USSR and France, up to the highest level, was emphasized. This suits the interests of the peoples of both countries, the interests of peace and security in Europe and all over the world.

The conversation passed in a spirit of frankness [otkrovennost] and mutual respect.

In the afternoon Andrey Gromyko had a conversation with French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy.

Questions of bilateral cooperation with a special emphasis on the development of commercial and economic ties between the USSR and France held the main place in that conversation. On the whole both sides positively assess the state of these ties and have favorably characterized the course of the implementation of major long-term contracts concluded between the two countries, including a contract on the deliveries of natural gas from the USSR to France. They proceed from the view that there exist conditions for further development of this cooperation in the given sphere to the mutual benefit.

Andrey Gromyko underlined the need for preventing the setbacks leading to artificial restrictions in trade and exchanges. The mutual conviction was expressed about the possibility of resolving arising problems in the framework of the operating mechanisms of cooperation, specifically during a regular session of the "big" Soviet-French mixed commission planned for next November.

On both sides the desire was expressed to contribute to a better mutual understanding through a further development of cooperation in the field of culture, science and technology, and education.

Some internal problems of interest to the Soviet Union and France were also raised.

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On September 9 talks were held between Andrey Gromyko and Minister for External Relations of France Claude Cheysson. Within the framework of the continuation of the Soviet-French political dialogue, a detailed exchange of opinions was held on topical problems of the international situation, as well as on some of the issues of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and France.

On the Soviet side, concern was expressed over the current tense state of international relations -- which is also shared by France and the need was stressed for uniting the efforts of all states with a view to preventing nuclear war and strengthening universal peace. Andrey Gromyko stressed that in a situation that has become more complicated, it is important to strive for a broader mutual understanding between the USSR and France. As has repeatedly been the sase in the past, this benefits detente and peace.

The discussion centered on questions of the situation in Europe from the viewpoint of the heightening threat of nuclear escalation on the continent.

Andrey Gromyko pointed to a constructive, far-reaching character of the Soviet stand at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear arms limitation in Europe. The attention of the French side was called to the new Soviet initiative advanced by Yuriy Andropov, the initiative which expresses the readiness of the Soviet Union in case of the United States' nondeployment of its missiles in Europe and the achievement of mutually acceptable agreement to liquidate all the medium-range missiles to be reduced in the European part of the USSR, including a considerable number of the SS-20 missiles. Now at the Geneva talks there exists a basis for reaching agreement not infringing on anybody's interests and it has been created by the efforts of the Soviet Union.

Speaking out for a productive outcome of the Geneva talks, Claude Cheysson at the same time stated the well-known position of the French side on the question of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Andrey Gromyko and Claude Cheysson pointed out that they attach special importance to the successful completion of the Madrid meeting, to the adoption of the decision to convene a conference on confidence-building measures, security and disarmament in Europe, the preparatory work for which is to begin already this year. Agreement was reached on continuing consultations and opinion exchanges between the USSR and France on the questions of the conference.

In examining the questions of the upcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly, the attention of the French minister was drawn to the proposal, tabled by the Soviet Union, to ban the use of force in space and from space with respect to the earth. The hope was expressed that France would give full attention to this new Soviet initiative and join in the efforts aimed at preventing the militarization of space.

Andrey Gromyko stressed the inadmissibility of interference in the internal affairs of peoples, especially by armed force, and the need to contribute to the settlement of the existing conflicts taking into account the legitimate interest of peoples and states.

Since the question of the incident with the South Korean plane was raised on the French side, Andrey Gromyko said that the Soviet position on this score has already been stated in an exhaustive manner, including the Soviet Government's statement of September 6 of this year. There is no doubt that this major provocation was conceived by the United States against the USSR, and, on a broader plane, pursues the aim of sharpening the international situation. The sponsors of this criminal act would wish to divert the attention of states and peoples from the truly essential tasks requiring solutions, above all in the field of security in Europe and the world, and ending the nuclear arms race. This must not be allowed to happen.

In examining the state and the prospects for the development of bilateral relations between the USSR and France, a reciproval readiness was expressed for their further advancement, and in the process the role played by political contacts in the overall major complex of cooperation was singled out.

The talks were held in a businesslike manner, and were characterized by the sides' desire to seek common ground.

Claude Cheysson gave a dinner in honor of the Soviet guest, also attended by a number of ministers of the government of France.

Gromyko Returns to Moscow

LD101456 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 10 Sep 83

[Text] Moscow, 10 Sep (TASS) -- At the end of his working visit to Paris, Andrey Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and USSR minister of foreign affairs, returned to Moscow today.

In Moscow he was met by Comrade Gorbachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by deputy ministers from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and by other officials.

IRELAND EXPELS THREE SOVIET DIPLOMATS

NC092020 Paris AFP in English 2014 GMT 9 Sep 83

[Text] Dublin, Sept 9 (AFP) -- Ireland has decided to expel three Soviet diplomats, including the first and second secretaries at the embassy here, for "unacceptable" activities, Junior Minister for Foreign Affairs Jim O'Keefe said here today. Mr O'Keefe said here First Secretary G.A. Salin and Second Secretary V.I. Lipassov and his wife had been asked to leave for activities "not in accordance with the international standards of behavior expected of diplomatic staff."

The decision, he said, was based on "information available" to the Irish Government, and that he had called in the Soviet charge d'affaires here to inform him of the government decision. A government spokesman added that the decision was not connected with the destruction last week of a Korean airliner by Soviet planes. Reasons why diplomats are usually expelled are "internationally known," the spokesman said, which implied that the three were accused of espionage. It was the first time Ireland expelled personnel from the Soviet mission here, where 24 diplomats are posted.

Espionage Against NATO Alleged

NC101842 Paris AFP in English 1826 GMT 10 Sep 83

[Text] Dublin, Sep 10 (AFP) -- The three Soviet diplomats who were expelled from the Irish Republic yesterday had spied on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, including Britain, sources close to Irish intelligence services said today. Embassy First Secretary Gennadiy Salin, and Second Secretary Viktor Lipassov and his wife, had used Eire, which is not a NATO member, as a base to gather information later relayed to Moscow using secret radio codes, the source said. At least one Irish agent was in their service, it was said. The diplomats were under strict surveillance from July and the British governments and other European administrations were kept informed of developments, the source alleged. Mrs Lipassov, who was expelled not because of her marital status but because she herself was implicated, travelled regularly between Ireland and Britain over a four year period, it was disclosed.

Mr Lipassov's name is listed in a book by John Barron, "KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Agents", published in London in 1974. Its index lists him among Soviet agents implicated in alleged underground operations. Next to his name appears the comment "Denmark 1972". Prime Minister Garret Fitzgerald today refused to comment on the incident.

The Irish Government has not issued any explanation beyond the statement earlier today by Junior Foreign Minister Jim O'Keefe which said the diplomats had been asked to leave after activities "not in accordance with the international standards of behavior expected of diplomatic staff." A government spokesman said the expulsions had nothing to do with the downing last week of the Korean Air Lines jumbo jet by Soviet fighters. The affair entailed the first expulsions of Soviet representatives here since the Irish Republic became independent. It became the 11th European country to throw out alleged Soviet spies since January. A total of 72 Soviet diplomats have been sent home since the start of the year: 47 from France, five from Britain, four each from Switzerland and Italy, three each from Norway and Eire, two from Belgium, and one each from Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands and West Germany.

LEBANON REQUESTS UN SECURITY COUNCIL SESSION

LD111228 Moscow TASS in English 0646 GMT 11 Sep 83

[Text] New York September 11 TASS -- The Lebanese Government has requested an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council. A letter of Lebanon's permanent representative to the United Nations stresses the escalation of military operations in that country, as a consequence of which there are numerous losses and much damage to property. Despite efforts that are being made, Lebanon has not succeeded in averting fresh armed clashes. This situation cannot continue without jeopardizing international peace and security, and also the fate of the independent country the people of which are trying to preserve their freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the document stresses.

It will not be the first time this year that the Security Council will consider the situation in Lebanon. Delegates of many countries have pointed out at the meetings of the council that the capitulatory unequal agreement imposed on Lebanon by the United States and Israel is infringing on the sovereignty and independence of the Lebanese state and creating a threat to the security of Syria and other Arab countries. The fallacy of Washington's hypocritical attempts to absolve itself of responsibility for the absence of peace in Lebanon and to place it at the doors of those parties which themselves are targets of aggression have been constantly stressed in the Security Council.

It is only the United States, which is known to occupy a strategically sensitive part of Lebanon in the guise of a multinational force and to perpetrate killings and other crimes against the civilian population of that country, that is guilty of the latest aggravation of the situation, U.N. circles note. The restoration of the sovereignty and the ensuring of the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon are hampered by the growing military intervention of the United States and its allies in that country. U.S. Marines are actually engaged in Lebanon in full-scale combat operations supported by heavy artillery and aircraft-borne aviation based on the "Eisenhower" aircraft carrier in close proximity of the Lebanese shores. There also are French naval ships, and Britain is going to send its "Hermes" aircraft carrier into the region.

U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar has voiced profound worry over the incessant combat operations in Lebanon. He has made an appeal in an official statement released at the United Nations for support for the efforts aimed at achieving a cease-fire and ensuring national unity in Lebanon. The U.N. secretary general has also announced a postponement of his visit to Washington, initially scheduled for September 12.

U.S. MARINES FUNCTION AS 'OCCUPATION' TROOPS

LD111202 Moscow Domestic Television Service in Russian 1445 GMT 9 Sep 83

[From "The World Today" program presented by political observer Boris Kalyagin]

[Excerpts] A tense situation continues in Lebanon. Walid Junblatt, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, has said that his forces will not allow army units to occupy the area inhabited by the Druze until a special agreement is concluded. He accused the American Marines of giving support to units of the Lebanese Army and to the Phalangists. As far as one can judge, such support is going to become broader. President Reagan has sent a message to Geraghty, commander of U.S. Marines in Lebanon, saying that he will receive whatever military help is needed. American warships and land-based artillery batteries have already shelled the mountain areas where the Muslim population lives. The aim of the firing was corrected by American aircraft.

The United States is threatening that not only will American heavy artillery be used against detachments of the Muslim militia, but also that bombing strikes will be made by carrier-based aircraft from the aircraft carrier "Eisenhower," which is lying just off Beirut.

It is significant that even the American TIME magazine decided to come out with a warning about the U.S. growing military involvement in Lebanese affairs. Speaking about the actions of American servicemen, the magazine stresses that events in Lebanon are taking on ever more familiar features, repeating what happened in Vietnam and El Salvador. Other participants in the conflict, the magazine warns, will acquire the opportunity to say that what is going on in the country is not a civil war but an armed struggle against American occupation. The remark is quite timely: The American Marines, who took over from the Israeli interventionists are already effectively functioning as occupation troops.

ISRAEL 'MAKING ROOM' FOR U.S. TROOPS IN LEBANON

PM111437 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Sep 83 First Edition p 5

[Yuriy Glukhov "Commentator's Column": "Preparing for a Division"]

[Text] Alarming reports continue to be received from Lebanon. The U.S. armed interference in Lebanese affairs is becoming more and more overt. Combat operations are no longer conducted only by the U.S. Marines who are part of the so-called "multinational forces." The U.S. 6th Fleet armada anchored off the Lebanese coast is coming into action. F-14 aircraft based on the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier "Eisenhower" have been sent into action. A task force of French ships has also arrived off the Lebanese coast, including the aircraft carrier "Foch," with 40 fighters and helicopters on board. The French have also been given orders to shoot. It looks as though Washington and Paris are repeating in Lebanon a kind of variation of the "Chad option" for joint action in carrying out gendarme functions.

The exacerbation of the Lebanese crisis is occurring against the background of the so-called "redeployment" of Israeli troops. Having pulled out of the mountain regions of Ash-Shuf and 'Alayh, the occupiers have moved to previously prepared reinforced positions along the Al-'Awwali river. This maneuver stems from the fact that the interventionists found themselves incapable of fully controlling all the areas occupied by them. They have been sustaining casualties.

In this connection, Tel Aviv intends to consolidate the occupation in southern Lebanon, where Israeli punitive forces are keeping over 500,000 people in fear and submission. It is, further more, planned to step up the economic "assimilation" of the occupied areas. What is at stake is the plundering of natural resources: the diversion of the Al-Litani river's waters to Israel. The aggressors are calculating on the implementation of their expansionist schemes by crude force and are pushing matters toward the annexation of southern Lebanon. For this purpose the Israeli expanionists are concentrating their troops into a single strike force. At the same time, they are threatening to deal new blows against both Lebanon and Syria.

The "redeployment" is also linked with U.S.-Israeli strategic plans. By pulling out, the Israelis are making room for the Pentagon's warriors. The withdrawal to new positions was arranged in such a way as to provoke intercommunal clashes in the mountains of Lebanon. A pretext is being created for U.S. armed interference in that part of the country, just as it happened in Beirut. They want to divide Lebanon into U.S. and Israeli occupation zones and turn it into a protectorate of Washington and Tel Aviv.

The tragic fate of Lebanon causes concern and alarm among all people of good will. Advocating Lebanon's unity and the restoration of that country's trampled sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, the peoples demand that the imperialist and Zionist intrigues be ended.

ISRAELI ARRESTS 'CAMPAIGN' IN WEST BANK CITED

LD111454 Moscow TASS in English 1118 GMT 11 Sep 83

[Text] Damascus September 11 TASS -- The Israeli Army has launched another campaign of arrests in the occupied West Bank. As a result of searches and round-ups carried out by the invaders near Nabulus and other cities, several dozen Arabs have been imprisoned on the standard charges of "involvement in the Palestinian resistance movement".

USSR-PDRY FOREIGN MINISTRY CONSULTATIONS HELD

PM091148 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Sep 83 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Consultations in the USSR Foreign Ministry"]

[Text] Consultations took place at the USSR Foreign Ministry 5-7 September between representatives of the USSR Foreign Ministry and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [PDRY] Foreign Ministry on questions connected with the 38th UN General Assembly session. Taking part in the consultations were: on the Soviet side -- V.P. Petrovskiy, member of the USSR Foreign Ministry collegium: on the South Yemeni side -- 'Abd al-'Aziz Baysah, chief of the PDRY Foreign Ministry International Organizations and Conferences Department.

ALGIERS ACCORD 'GOOD BASIS' FOR IRAN-IRAQ TRUCE

NC030946 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1700 GMT 2 Sep 83

[Igor Sheftunov commentary]

[Excerpts] Greetings, dear listeners. As you know, Iran's Foreign Minister Velayati participated in the international conference on the Palestine problem which was held in Geneva following a UN General Assembly decision. Velayati pointed out that dispersion and discord among the ranks of Islamic and Arab countries prevent an effective confrontation with U.S. and Israeli aggressions.

The Iran-Iraq war, which was instigated by the United States and which has been going on for nearly 3 years, has become one of the reasons for the dispersion and hostility among some of the regional countries. The Iran-Iraq war has halted progressive development in both countries.

Not only the people of Iran, but other nations of the region too, are interested in solving the differences between Iran and Iraq and the termination of their military conflict. There is a good basis for this: I am referring to the 1975 Algiers Agreement that is acceptable to both Iran and Iraq. It is also important to note that on 11 February 1981 Ayatollah Khomeyni stated that Iran respects international agreements and has no claims on even 1 inch of foreign territory, including Iraqi territory.

If Iran and Iraq display goodwill and realism, undoubtedly they can end their long military conflict. This is, first and foremost, within the interests of the peoples of the two conflicting sides. Halting the war will also undoubtedly help to strengthen the unity and solidarity of Islamic nations in their struggle against U.S. and Israeli aggressions. It will help to ensure the rights of the afflicted Arab Palestinians and to restore Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

WEINBERGER VISIT TO CENTRAL AMERICA ANALYZED

Checks on Maneuvers

LD080003 Moscow Domestic Television Service in Russian 1445 GMT 7 Sep 83

[From "The World Today" program presented by political observer Viktor Mikheyev]

[Text] Pentagon head Weinberger is now in Panama to inspect the progress of the unprecedented military-political provocative action. This is the "Big Pine" military maneuvers, in which major U.S. units are taking part. All this is being undertaken to frighten the peoples of Latin America, particularly Nicaragua. Stalking the jungles of Panama, the Pentagon chief is letting it be understood that the United States will continue its military interference in the affairs of Latin America, that it will train the punitive detachments of the local dictators in the methods of suppressing the liberation movements, and will, if necessary, take direct part in combat operations.

'Confirms' Aid for El Salvador

LD091703 Moscow TASS in English 1404 GMT 9 Sep 83

[Text] New York September 8 TASS -- U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger, now touring Central American countries, held talks with the head of the Salvadoran puppet regime Magana and Defence Minister Videz Casanova.

He assured them that the United States will continue increasing the military deliveries to Salvador. The chief of the Pentagon stressed particularly that he will be pressing for additional allocations from the U.S. budget of another 24 million dollars for the reinforcement of the army of that Central American country. The Washington "champions of democracy" are unabashed by the fact that the United States is actually a direct accomplice in the atrocities of the criminal regime in Salvador where over 42 thousand people were killed in the past three years.

During his visit to San Vicente Department, which is one of the zones of intensive military operations of members of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, Weinberger tried to assert that the Salvadoran forces allegedly "are successful" in fighting against the guerrillas. But news agencies write sarcastically that when the "distinguished guest" spoke he was guarded by soldiers of the puppet regime who were armed to the teeth and that a few hours after his departure the rebels staged a new combat operation in the area. San Vicente confirms again that the policy of genocide implemented by the Salvadoran regime against the peaceful population has the full approval of official Washington. The ASSOCIATED PRESS notes that Weinberger himself made an inspection to see how the so-called "pacification programme" is implemented in that department. The ASSOCIATED PRESS pointed out that this programme is financed and implemented under U.S. forces in Vietnam [sentence as received]. In other words, the implementation of this programme results in burned down villages and mass executions of peasants whom the punitives regard as "potential reserve" of the rebels.

The Pentagon's chief also went on board the "New Jersey" battleship of the U.S. Navy which is sailing in the Pacific off the coast of Central America. In a reportage about this the U.S. television company NBC pointed out that these scenes were reminiscent of the times of the war in Vietnam.

Inspects Troops in Honduras

LD092227 Moscow Domestic Television Service in Russian 1445 GMT 9 Sep 83

[From "The World Today" program presented by political observer Boris Kalyagin]

[Text] At the same time as the military provocation was perpetrated against Nicaragua, U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger was in neighboring Honduras. He was inspecting American troops and attending the maneuvers being carried out by 5,000 American servicemen jointly with the Honduran Army near the Nicaraguan border. His visit was intended to inspire the Honduran military and the Somozists to further sorties against the revolutionary republic. However, when Weinberger was asked what he thought about the terrorist raid on Managua the Pentagon chief declined to reply to the question.

CIA 'MASTERMINDS' MANAGUA AIRPORT BOMBING

LD091741 Moscow TASS in English 0615 GMT 9 Sep 83

[Text] Managua September 9 TASS -- The building of Managua International Airport has been severely damaged, representing a picture of charred walls, heaps of metal scrap and burnt premises, following a barbaric bombing raid masterminded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and carried out by its mercenaries. A plane, flown by two counter-revolutionary terrorists, dropped two 250 kg bombs during its criminal raid. It was then shot down by an anti-aircraft gun battery. The fire which broke out as a result of the explosion gutted the airport building.

At the same time, at about 5:30 am, another intruder plane bombed Managua's district where lives the Republic's Foreign Affairs Minister Miguel D'Escoto. One of the bombs fell close to an elementary schoolhouse.

Comandante Raul Venerio, commander of the Nicaraguan Air Force has told TASS correspondent Sergey Gorbunov that both planes took off from Costa Rican territory and carried out the flight at a small height. This was a carefully planned action which is part of the criminal aggression unleashed against Nicaragua by the United States, Raul Venerio said. Four people were wounded in the bombing, heavy damage was inflicted to the airport building. It is mere luck that passengers waiting for their flights at the airport building escaped unhurt.

The bombing of Managua is another step in the escalation of the U.S. undeclared war against the Nicaraguan revolution, Nicaragua's Defence Minister Humberto Ortega told newsmen here. To implement its aggressive designs, he stressed, the CIA uses Costa Rican territory, brazenly acting behind the back of that country's government.

BOLIVIAN AMBASSADOR'S MOSCOW DEPARTURE REPORTED

PM070937 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Sep 83 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Ambassador Departs"]

[Text] Javier Murillo de la Rocha, Bolivian ambassador to the USSR, has left Moscow.

TRINIDAD, TOBAGO UNCOVER ANTIGOVERNMENTAL PLOT

LD032220 Moscow TASS in English 2138 GMT 3 Sep 83

[Text] Georgetown August 3 TASS -- The state security bodies of Trinidad and Tobago have uncovered an anti-government plot. It involves a nationalist organization existin in this insular state. This has been reported by an official spokesman of the Office of Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago.